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THE NEWEST PROPERTY: REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CONCEPT OF
PARENTHOOD
Kermit Roosevelt III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Normative sentiments about property rights in the hu-
man body tend to determine how the fundamental question of
positive law is framed. "Is the body nothing more than prop-
erty," ask those who oppose the commodification and loss of
dignity lurking in an affirmative response. "Can individuals
not control even their own bodies," is the question favored by
those who see autonomy enhanced by the free trade of human
body parts.2 This article intends no polemic in favor of either
perspective; this article goal is argumentatively modest but
descriptively more grand. It asks whether the law recognizes
property rights in the human body. Finding an affirmative
answer, it goes on to draw out some implications of these
rights. More specifically, it argues that the existence of prop-
erty rights in human reproductive materials forces us to re-
conceptualize parental rights.
Thus far nothing is novel. For decades, courts and com-
* Resident Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School 1998-
99. Harvard University, B.A. (1993); Yale Law School, J.D. (1997); Senior
Editor, Yale Law Journal; Editor, Yale Journal on Regulation. The author
would like to thank Jay Katz, Elizabeth K. Dollard, Professor Emeritus of
Law, Medicine and Psychiatry at Yale, and David Franklin, Visiting Assistant
Professor of Law at George Washington, for helpful commentary and sugges-
tions.
1. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990)
(Arabian, J., concurring); See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
2. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 303-20 (Peter
Laslett, 2d ed. 1967); Moore, 793 P.2d at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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mentators have declared that the engine of biotechnical inno-
vation will drive family law in unpredictable directions at
great speed.! The claim of this article is actually somewhat
reactionary: that scientific joyrides need not bring chaos to
the law. The existence of property rights in reproductive ma-
terials should produce a property-derived understanding of
parental rights, but it need not work much change in existing
doctrine. All recent Supreme Court parental rights cases
may be assimilated into the framework I propose,' and this
framework offers a quick and decisive resolution to otherwise
intractable problems of family law created by new reproduc-
tive technologies. The rules of this property model are, of
course, only default rules. Subject to certain constitutional
restrictions, the state has ample power to restrict property
rights in the body,5 and such restrictions may be wise.
II. THE BODY AS PROPERTY
Treating the body as property is, in some views, inher-
ently wrong. It carries the historical stigma of slavery, the
imprisonment of debtors and husbands' dominion over wives.
But the opposition here is directed largely at the idea that
one person's body could become another person's property,
and as such, it is fundamentally misguided. Property, as the
clich6 goes, is a bundle of rights: namely, the rights to pos-
sess, to use, to exclude others from use and to transfer.6
Some of these rights-possession, use and exclusion-are ob-
viously fundamental to human dignity and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.7 It is my property right to possess
3. See, e.g., John L. Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims
of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 353 (1991)
(commenting that "modern technology has wreaked havoc on conventional and
legal notions of parenthood"); Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The
Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 467 (1983) (discussing
.challenges that artificial conception poses for family law").
4. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119 (1989); Lehr v. Robert-
son, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
5. See infra text accompanying note 75.
6. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
7. This is the familiar language of substantive due process, see, e.g.,
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1716-17 (1998), and some prop-
erty-style rights to one's body do receive substantive due process protection.
See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced stomach pumping
violates Fourteenth Amendment). But the larger point is simply that these
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my body that is rendered inalienable by the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition of slavery; my right to exclude oth-
ers from the use of it that is protected by laws against bat-
tery; my right to use it myself that underlies freedom of con-
tract and various liberty interests.8 The idea that property
rights provide the appropriate theoretical grounding for
many of our most treasured liberties is a common feature of
property scholarship.9 The next logical step from the deter-
mination that people are not the property of others is em-
powering them to use their own property. This empower-
ment is a primary focus, for example, of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.10
Without any property rights in the body, we would have
the odd result that others have as much claim to our bodies
as we do-that, for example, I have no more right to my kid-
neys than a patient needing a transplant. Thus, with respect
to some of the rights in the bundle, the determination that
the body counts as property is both obvious and correct." It
is not the enforcement of these rights, but their lapse, that
threatens human dignity.
Indeed, the idea that the individual has rights in his own
body superior to those of any other party has a long and dis-
rights are fundamental to our understanding of the person-it is for that rea-
son that their violation "shocks the conscience" sufficiently to trigger due proc-
ess protection. See Lewis, 118 S.Ct. at 1717.
8. See Danielle M. Wagner, Comment, Property Rights in the Human
Body, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 931, 933 (1995).
9. Though it is often featured as a target. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 261-62
(1990) (arguing that protection of property rights may undermine individual
rights); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
329 (1996) (skeptically examining six common arguments for privileged status
of property rights). In the context of biological property, the argument for
property as the handmaid of liberty and autonomy is particularly strong. As
later sections of this article will show, the consequence of adopting a property-
rooted perspective on reproductive technologies is not simply to facilitate
wealth-producing transactions; it is to allow individuals to create legally recog-
nized families where they could not before.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 1998).
11. It could also be contended that the rights secured by recognition of a
property interest in the body are, or should be, protected by "different" more
"fundamental" rights-such as the right to bodily integrity-so that the body is
functionally super-property but the rhetoric of property is avoided. I accept
this argument with equanimity; it simply raises the question of which property
rights should be mimicked by the fundamental bundle of liberty, bodily integ-
rity, and so forth.
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tinguished philosophical history." Rights of use and exclu-
sion are uncontroversial. The controversial issue really is the
transferability of parts or elements of the body.13 This issue
of transferability has grown more pressing as medical tech-
nology has grown more impressive. When science tells us
that it is possible to accomplish something new, we must de-
cide if we should. Again, it is not my purpose to argue for
any particular moral position on this question. I intend only
to look at our laws and our practices to see what answers
they give. To what extent, then, is the body as property
transferable?
A. The Body Generally
It is little exaggeration to say that everything that can be
used can be transferred. Blood, hair, sweat, semen, teeth,
urine and pieces of skin and muscle have all been sold with-
out controversy. 4 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act" allows
for postmortem transfer of a wide range of body parts."
Despite the near universal reach of the rights of use and
exclusion, and the very broad reach of transferability, courts
have in some contexts refused to recognize property rights in
12. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 2, at 305; See also C. MACPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 3 (1962)
(discussing the importance of self-ownership to the individualist theorist of the
seventeenth century).
13. The transferability of the entire body, at least before death, is obviously
precluded by the 13th Amendment. The question of property rights in corpses
is somewhat more complex. Although a corpse is usually not considered part of
the decedent's estate, next of kin enjoy a quasi-property right to control disposi-
tion of the remains. See, e.g., Toliver v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1989).
Cases dealing with damage to corpses in transit, which have held uniformly
that human remains are "goods" covered by the Warsaw Convention, seem to
reflect a more unalloyed property conception. See, e.g., Onyeanusi v. Pan Am,
952 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1992). Jurisdictions differ on whether survivors'
property (or "quasi-property") rights in corpses may be offended by incineration
of organs or unconsented-to autopsies and experiments. Compare Brotherton v.
Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding property right violated by cor-
nea harvesting), with Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hospital, 360 N.W.2d 275
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to recognize property right). See generally Mi-
chelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REV. 209 (1990); Michael H. Scarmon, Note,
Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in the Human Body-Are the Goods
Oft Interred with Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429 (1991-92).
14. See RUSSELL SCOrT, THE BODYAS PROPERTY 190-91 (1981).
15. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1987).
16. Id. § 1(1) (defining "anatomical gift" as "all or part of a human body").
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surgically removed body parts. 7 What these cases turn on,
however, is the absence of any expression of intent to retain
an ownership interest. 8 This should not be taken to suggest
that such ownership interests cannot be asserted, as the
above discussion of the recognized transferability of many
body parts shows. Indeed, the relation of individuals to their
bodies features most of the rights in the property bundle. 9
There may be additional rights-for example, the govern-
ment likely cannot requisition your heart and compensate
you under the Takings Clause-but the property rights exist.
Therefore, it is hard to make sense of, much less to advocate,
the position that the human body is not property.
Much of the resistance to admitting the property nature
of individuals' relations to their bodies stems from the com-
modification argument.'o It is harmful to our idea of people
as beings worthy of respect, the argument goes, if we simul-
taneously price them, spleen to pancreas and so on.2' This
might be an argument for prohibiting the sale of bodily or-
gans; as such, it has won victory in a limited arena. Roughly
speaking, the sale of nonrenewable22 body parts is prohib-
ited.2" Thus corneas, livers and even kidneys, one of which
we can very well do without, are taken off the market. But if
this argument is extended to a broader range of biological
material, then it is best understood as merely an admonition
not to employ the rhetoric of property when talking about
people. In terms of our actual practices, the simple truth is
17. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)
(dismissing conversion claim based on physicians' use of excised spleen);
Browning v. Norton-Children's Hospital, 504 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1974) (refusing to
hold doctor as a bailee of amputated leg).
18. See, e.g., Venner v. State, 354 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976)
(rejecting Fourth Amendment claim against police seizure of marijuana-filled
balloons from defendant's excrement on grounds of defendant's abandonment).
In some circumstances, laws governing the disposal of surgical residue may
prevent people from asserting continued ownership.
19. See Wagner, supra note 8.
20. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 1.
21. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 497, (Arabian, J., concurring) (inveighing against
regarding "the human vessel-the single most venerated and protected subject
in any civilized society-as equal with the basest commercial commodity"); See
generally Radin, supra note 1.
22. This is only roughly true because eggs are, properly speaking, nonre-
newable; each woman has a finite supply.
23. The National Organ Transplant Act prohibits the sale of organs for
transplant or therapy. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 274(e) (Supp. 1994).
1998]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
that much biological material is property and recognized as
such. It is bought and sold every day.24
B. Reproductive Material
The transferability of reproductive material is particu-
larly well established. The sale of sperm and eggs is com-
monplace, and it appears never to have been suggested that
such transactions have no legal effect.25 Moreover, given the
alarming prospect of the misappropriation of genetic mate-
rial, the protection afforded by a property interest seems
eminently desirable. 26 However, courts have generally faced
the issue of whether sperm is property under more difficult
circumstances-after the death of the donor-without
24. For example, there are more than four hundred blood centers in the
United States that daily collect, buy and market blood products. See ANDREW
KIMBRELL, THE HUMAN BODY SHOP: THE ENGINEERING AND MARKETING OF
LIFE 20 (1993). The United States is the world leader in exporting blood, which
constitutes a two billion dollar industry. See id. at 21.
25. Again, this is not to say that restrictions on the sale of reproductive ma-
terials might not be wise. Although the American Association of Tissue Banks
notes that financial compensation for blood and reproductive cells is "condoned
by society," the American Fertility Society guidelines suggest that monetary
compensation beyond expenses not be offered to donors. See STANDARDS FOR
TIssuE BANKING §§ C1.210,220 (American Association of Tissue Banks 1984).
This would not, however, alter the conclusion that reproductive material is
property; many forms of property (for example, the shares of closely-held corpo-
rations) have restrictions on alienability. See Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My
Property, Hastings Center Report 28 (Oct. 1986).
26. For example, a couple attempting in vitro fertilization would certainly
be wronged if a physician intentionally destroyed their eggs or sperm, and still
more so if he provided them to a third party without the couple's knowledge.
See, e.g., Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, No. 74-3558
(S.D.N.Y. filed April 12, 1978) (awarding $50,000 for emotional distress when a
doctor deliberately destroyed the contents of the petri dish in which in vitro fer-
tilization was being attempted with the woman's egg and her husband's sperm);
See generally, William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables:
The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 693 (1995); Jennifer Long Collins, Note, Hecht v. Super. Court: Recogniz-
ing a Property Right in Reproductive Material, 33 U. LOUISEVILLE J. FAM. L.
661 (1995). People obviously care a great deal about what happens to their re-
productive material; in particular, they do not want that material used to pro-
duce children without their consent. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
601, 603 (Tenn. 1992) (referring to the "anguish of... unwanted parenthood"
and holding that "an interest in avoiding genetic parenthood can be significant
enough to trigger the protections afforded to all other aspects of parenthood").
A damages remedy against a doctor who does so will not undo the psychological
harm, but it will provide a deterrent. Criminal sanctions have also been sug-
gested. See Kristi Ayala, The Application of Traditional Criminal Law to Mis-
appropriation of Genetic Materials, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 503 (1997).
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reaching conclusive results.
In perhaps the most famous case, a decedent's girlfriend
waged a six-year legal battle to obtain control of fifteen vials
of frozen sperm he willed to her.2" The California Court of
Appeals wavered in its determination that the frozen sperm
was property of the estate, 8 and the California Supreme
Court, denying review, decertified the last appellate opin-
ion. 9 Thus the legal dispute came to an end without creating
conclusive precedent. ° Given that sperm and eggs do bear all
of the ordinary attributes of property, however, it is hard to
deny that their possessors have property rights in them.
Like the question of posthumous reproduction, the ques-
tion of what happens when the sperm and the egg combine is
more difficult.31 At some point the embryo becomes a fetus,
and at some point the interest of the gamete providers is no
longer a property interest. With respect to very early em-
bryos, however, the need for recognition of property rights
seems just as great as with respect to sperm and eggs."2 Ju-
dicial treatment of embryos has not been uniform. In York v.
Jones,33 after three unsuccessful attempts at in vitro fertiliza-
tion with the Jones Institute, the Yorks asked for the release
of one of their frozen embryos in order to try the procedure at
a different clinic in California. When the Jones Institute re-
fused to release the embryo, the Yorks sued. Denying the de-
27. See Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993); Kane v. Super. Ct.,
37 Cal. App. 4th 1577 (1995); Hecht v. Superior. Court., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222
(Cal. App. 1996), review denied, ordered not published.
28. Compare Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 850 (1993) (stating
that semen is property within the meaning of the Probate Code), with Hecht v.
Super. Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 226 (1996) (stating that semen is not subject to
terms of property settlement).
29. See Hecht v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 222 (1996).
30. See infra Part V.D. (discussing posthumous reproduction).
31. Like posthumous reproduction, it will be considered in greater detail in
a subsequent section.
32. Allegations of misappropriation of embryos have occurred and may be
expected to continue. In one well publicized case, five embryos created and fro-
zen by a couple pursuing in vitro fertilization were allegedly thawed and given
to another couple, producing twins. See Susan Kelleher, Family Feels Whole
After the Birth of a Baby Boy, ORANGE CoUNTY REG., Feb. 4, 1997, at B1. The
embryo creators' suit for custody of the twins, now eight years old, is pending.
Id. Other alleged misappropriations by the same clinic have given rise to nu-
merous lawsuits. See generally, Rebecca S. Snyder, Reproductive Technology
and Stolen Ova: Who is the Mother, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 289 (1998) (discussing
cases).
33. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
1998]
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fendants' motion to dismiss, the court had no difficulty in
finding that the Yorks had a property interest in the embryo
and that their contract with the Jones Institute created a
bailment.34 Consequently, the court ruled, the Jones Insti-
tute was obligated to return the embryo.35
Vindicating the property interests of the Yorks against
third parties was an easy result to reach. However, in Davis
v. Davis,3" the opposing parties were divorcing spouses. They
sought to conceive through artificial insemination and had
frozen seven fertilized ova. 7 Both their attempts to conceive
and their marriage failed, and in the divorce proceeding, both
sought control of the frozen embryos.38
Mary Sue Davis had originally intended to use the em-
bryos herself. Junior Davis wished them to remain frozen
while he decided whether or not he wanted to become a par-
ent. By the time the case reached the Tennessee Supreme
Court, both Mary Sue and Junior had remarried, and Mary
Sue's intention had changed. She then wanted to donate the
embryos to a childless couple, while Junior wanted them to
be destroyed. 9
The Tennessee court rejected the idea that embryos could
be the subject of property interests, finding that they occu-
pied an "interim category" between property and person-
hood.4 ° Junior and Mary Sue nonetheless had "an interest in
the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have deci-
sion-making authority concerning the disposition of the pre-
embryos."4
The judicial trend, perhaps motivated by a desire to pro-
tect the interests of parties such as the Yorks, has been to ac-
cord gamete providers at least the functional equivalent of
property rights. At least one court has held it "clear" that the
34. Id. at 425.
35. Id.
36. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
37. See id. at 591-92.
38. Some authorities characterize a fertilized ovum as a "pre-embryo" until
fourteen days after fertilization. See American Fertility Society, Ethical Con-
siderations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 J. AM. FERTILITY Soc. No.
6, 31s-36s (June 1990); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 101 (1994).
For the sake of simplicity, I will use the term "embryo" regardless of maturity.
39. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
40. Id. at 597.
41. Id.
[Vol. 39
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relationship is "in the nature of a property interest."42 Given
that gamete providers have rights to possess their embryos,
to use them and to donate them to or withhold them from
others,43 it is hard to deny that embryos constitute property.
The significance of finding that embryos constitute prop-
erty may not be obvious. If property rights in reproductive
materials and embryos are functionally preserved by the ex-
isting legal regime, it might seem that little turns on an ex-
plicit recognition of the property status of such material. In-
deed, it might be supposed that preservation of the rights
and avoidance of the rhetoric is desirable in order to avoid
corrosive commodification. One might argue, then, that the
best course of action would be to treat reproductive material
as property but continue to speak gingerly of "quasi-property"
and "interim categories." The next section of this article ar-
gues that explicit acceptance of the fact that reproductive
material is legally property will have at least one salutary
consequence. It will explain why parental rights cases come
out the way they do; it will reveal property rights as the hid-
den variable of family law.
III. OF PARENTAGE AND PROPERTY
I have argued thus far that, at least with respect to re-
productive material, property rights in the body are recog-
nized both by law and by customary practice. The preceding
analysis, admittedly, paints with a broad brush. There are
some complexities I have not addressed. For example, the
status of biological property still within the body will be im-
portant in later discussions. The objective in this section is
to seek out the source of parental rights. There will be sig-
nificant legal implications if the source of parental rights is,
as I shall argue, property rights.
A clarifying note or two is in order at this point. First,
the claim is not that parental rights are or resemble property
42. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), affd 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.
1998). Kass went on to comment, however, that "[e]quating zygotes with
washing machines and jewelry for the purposes of a marital distribution bor-
ders on the absurd." Id. at *2. There has also been legislative reaction in the
opposite direction. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121, 9:126 (West 1991)
(providing that embryos are juridical persons and not property). See also infra
text accompanying notes 235-251.
43. These rights are recognized by Davis and York.
1998]
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rights. Although historically, the two were strongly associ-
ated,"4 the idea of one person having property rights in an-
other is repugnant to modern sensibilities, and it is emphati-
cally not the proposition I advance. My contention is simply
that the best way to determine who has parental rights in
any given instance is to look to who held the property rights
in the reproductive material at the beginning of gestation.45
Second, the argument that parental rights "really" flow from
property rights is not an argument of metaphysics, one to be
derived in pure abstractions unrelated to our culture and
practices. Nor is it purely a normative argument that for
various reasons the legislature should decide and proclaim
that this relation between rights exists.
I propose that the model of parental rights flowing from
property rights is the best interpretation of the existing legal
doctrine. Although I will employ some thought-experiments,
designed to highlight the inadequacies of other theories, the
principal merit of my analytic framework is its ability to rec-
oncile various judicial decisions that might seem otherwise
inconsistent.46 I will then argue that this framework brings
order to unsettled areas of family law created by new repro-
ductive technologies, though the result will depend on the
answers society gives to the various questions these tech-
nologies present.
A. The Source of Parental Rights
The parent-child relation is a cord woven of distinct
threads.47 In what has been called the "customary" model, a
husband impregnates his wife, who gestates the child; upon
44. See McGough & Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child
Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMoRY L.J. 209, 210
(1978).
45. By "gestation" I mean gestation culminating in birth. The distinction is
important given the possibility of conception followed by uterine lavage, a tech-
nique that creates embryos within the body and then extracts them.
46. For example, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S 248 (1983), held that biological
fathers had a "unique opportunity" to forge a constitutionally protected rela-
tionship with their children, but Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989),
upheld a California law providing a conclusive presumption that the husband of
a married woman was the father of children she bore.
47. It is often suggested that maternal and paternal rights are constructed
differently. I believe the difference is overstated, and I attempt to show that on
the model I put forth, mothers and fathers gain their rights in much the same
way. See infra Part III.A.
[Vol. 39
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birth, both spouses possess parental rights and responsibili-
ties.48 The common law presumption of legitimacy awarded
paternal rights to a woman's husband regardless of whether
extended physical absence made biological paternity impossi-
ble.49 Post-birth adoptions, although not existing at common
law,5" are undoubtedly of ancient vintage. Adoption, how-
ever, works a transfer of parental rights and does not affect
the initial vesting of parental rights.5 The focus of this arti-
cle is on the original possessors of parental rights.
Genetic relation, gestation and social relationship are
separate strands of the parental bond, but until relatively re-
cently they were not readily separable.52 Modern technology
now allows for a dizzying variety of variations on the custom-
ary model, 3 and as the cord unravels, we must decide which
thread to follow. This article suggests that we need a new
thread-one based on property-for children can now be
brought into the world under circumstances that baffle all
the traditional indicia of parenthood. 4
When disputes over parental rights arise, a rational and
predictable resolution is important not only to the parties be-
fore the court, but to all those seeking to create families by
nontraditional means. Determining in whom parental rights
initially vest is essential to this purpose because, unlike
48. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 3, at 355 n.10.
49. See Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed
Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 371 (1988). The presumption has
been relaxed in most states by giving various parties the ability to rebut it.
50. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977).
51. See Hill, supra note 3, at 354 and 354 n.8.
52. Artificial insemination is actually quite old, but its widespread use is a
creature of this century. Other techniques of assisted reproduction, such as in
vitro fertilization, are much more recent arrivals.
53. See Hill, supra note 3, at 355 n.10 (setting out 16 permutations).
54. Fears that courts may be similarly baffled are not groundless. A Cali-
fornia court recently confronted a situation in which a married couple had pur-
chased sperm and an ovum from anonymous donors. See Buzzanca v. Buz-
zanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1998). The resulting embryo was
implanted in a surrogate, who carried the child to term. Before birth, however,
the couple divorced, and the ex-husband denied any responsibility for the child.
The ex-wife sued for support and the trial court found that the ex-husband was
not the legal father-and neither was the ex-wife. The child had no legal par-
ents. Id. at 282. The trial court's decision did not survive appellate review; the
court of appeals characterized it as "extraordinary" and reversed. Id. Still, it
reveals something of the confusion under which courts are operating. See gen-
erally Jerald V. Hale, From Baby M. to Jaycee B.: Fathers, Mothers, and Chil-
dren in the Brave New World, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 335 (1998).
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property rights, parental rights are not freely transferable.
Laws against baby-selling ensure that they may not be sold
at all,55 and even private uncompensated transfers lack
binding legal effect.56
Of the elements mentioned above, genetic relation might
seem to have the strongest claim of being the essential pre-
cursor of parental rights. Yet a glance at our laws shows
that this is clearly not the case. Not only did the marital
presumption vest parental rights in a man who might not be
the biological father, but the Uniform Parentage Act,57 as well
as most states, allow donors of reproductive material to avoid
parental rights altogether.58
Gestation is the next obvious candidate. This too proves
inadequate, although the failure is not as clearly demonstra-
ble. It is logically conceivable that a surrogate who gestates
a couple's embryo should thereby gain parental rights, even if
the parties intend otherwise. Nonetheless, the principle that
gestation alone does not suffice has fairly broad intuitive ap-
peal. In any event, the cases have consistently denied that
parental rights vest in a gestational surrogate, so gestation
itself cannot be the fundamental determinant of parental
status."
Social relationship cannot be the root of parental rights
for the obvious reason that a social relationship takes time to
55. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1231 (N.J. 1988) (discussing
New Jersey baby selling statute).
56. See, e.g., Sporleder v. Hermes, 471 N.W.2d 202, 211-12 (Wis. 1991).
Pre-conception "adoption" is a special case because no rights exist pre-
conception, and it might appear that there can, thus be no transfer. However,
if it were true that, for example, parental rights vested automatically in the ge-
netic parents of a child, then any agreement to the contrary would work a real,
if perhaps unacknowledged, transfer of the rights and be subject to governmen-
tal regulation.
57. Unif. Parentage Act § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
58. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology:
Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 533-39 (1994); Michael J. Yaworsky,
Annotation, Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human Artificial Insemina-
tion, 83 A.L.R. 4th 295 (1991). Some state statutes provide that parental rights
of sperm donors are avoided if and only if the sperm is provided to a licensed
physician. This provision has upset some parenting agreements. See infra Part
IV.A. But, the point is simply that if rights can be avoided (rather than termi-
nated), genetic connection cannot be fundamental.
59. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that ges-
tational surrogate has no parental rights under California version of Uniform
Parentage Act); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Com. P1. 1994) (same
under Ohio version).
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develop. Although gestation seems to play a role similar to
social relationship in some of the case law, allowing the per-
fection of otherwise potential parental rights,"0 we have seen
that gestation by itself does not suffice.6 Where custody dis-
putes arise over newborns, the outcome clearly cannot de-
pend on a relationship that does not yet exist.
Finally, parenthood is not simply a creation of the state.
While state law determines many of the parameters of the
nature and vesting of parental rights, it operates within con-
stitutional constraints. A state may not terminate parental
rights without violating the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment unless it shows that the parent is unfit,"
and it may not vest those rights in whichever parties it se-
lects.63
The popular academic response to the unraveling of the
parental tie is that the essential link is intention." Yet in-
tention, if taken as the fundamental source of parental
rights, requires some odd epicycles in the theory of parent-
hood. For one, it suggests at first glance that unplanned
pregnancies do not produce parents. One possible resolution
to this difficulty is the claim that intention is just a trump; if
no intention exists, biological parents are parents.65  The
problem with this resolution is that in many cases intention
should not trump biology. We might imagine a disturbed
couple, desperate for a grandchild, who sabotaged their
60. See infra text accompanying note 108.
61. See supra text accompanying note 59.
62. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
63. For example, it would be clearly unconstitutional for a state to enact a
law under which parental rights to newborns were assigned to whichever cou-
ple scored highest on a "parenting test." The basic problem with such a law
would be its inconsistency with the constitutional restrictions on termination of
parental rights. See, e.g., id. Of course, vesting rights in a different couple is
not precisely the same as terminating the biological parents' vested rights. In
some circumstances, such as artificial insemination, this distinction is meaning-
ful: the donor's rights are not terminated but never come into being. But to be
realistic, such a law would unquestionably be experienced as taking the low-
scoring couple's child away, rather than as preventing them from having chil-
dren. Even taken as a restriction on who may have children, the law would fall
under Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), which recognizes a fun-
damental right to procreate.
64. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 3, (advocating intent-based understanding of
parenthood); Schiff, supra note 58 (same); Marjorie, Maguire Shultz, Reproduc-
tive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neu-
trality, 1990 WIs. L. REv. 297 (1990) (same).
65. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 3, at 387.
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daughter's birth control. We find it harder, I think, to imag-
ine that they thereby secure another child of their own.
A property-derived understanding of parental rights re-
solves the above two examples quite easily. With regard to
unplanned pregnancies, it is clear that there has been no
transfer of property rights, and parental rights will vest in
the original owners of the reproductive materials. Similarly,
where one party causes another to procreate, their intention
to create a child does not alter the existing configuration of
property rights.
An additional problem with the theory of intention as a
trump is that it does not explain how intention can prevent
parental rights from vesting.66 Where there are more than
two parties contending for parental status, intention may be
able to play such a role. Assuming a child can have only two
parents and intention trumps, then the claims of the intend-
ing parents will defeat other claims." In the case of a single
woman artificially inseminated with sperm from a known
donor, however, it is not clear by what means the donor's
rights are avoided.6
Finally, if a physician either accidentally or intentionally
inseminates a woman with donor sperm against her wishes
or without her knowledge," we are again confronted with a
66. That in some cases intention cannot do so is quite clear. If an unmar-
ried couple has intercourse following an agreement that the man shall have no
parental rights or obligations, courts have been uniform in holding that such
contracts have no legal effect. See, e.g., Straub v. Todd, 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind.
1994); Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607 (S.D. 1993). For a property-based
analysis of such agreements, see infra Part V.A.3.
67. However, it seems relatively clear that on the intention model, there
can be more than two intending parents. More significantly, if intention is not
necessary to parental rights, it is somewhat mysterious how the existence of
intention defeats otherwise adequate claims. In a surrogacy case, for example,
it would seem more reasonable that the surrogate and the intending parents
would all have parental rights. It could be maintained, of course, that if any
claimant is an intending parent, intention becomes a necessary condition. This
proposal too has difficulties. Consider a couple that has intercourse using con-
traception. One of them, desiring a child, foils the contraceptive device. It runs
against intuition and justice to suppose that a woman could in this way obtain a
child without allowing the man parental rights, and the case is still worse if the
duplicitous party is the man. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1983)
(holding allegations of fraud with respect to contraception irrelevant to pater-
nity).
68. "Avoided" and not "extinguished." The issue of what might happen to
parental rights that have vested is beyond the scope of this article.
69. The idea is distasteful, but the first recorded artificial insemination in
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situation in which neither gamete provider intends to procre-
ate. The woman clearly does not intend to; the donor intends
to create a child but not to be its parent, and it is the intent
to be a parent that the intention theorists look to. The inten-
tion model, as supplemented by the biological default re-
quired to explain allocation of parental rights in unintended
pregnancies, apparently suggests that each becomes a par-
ent.70 Yet it seems more plausible to argue that the donor,
who would have no parental right if his sperm were provided
to a willing recipient, does not become a parent in this case
either."v
Once again, understanding parental rights as rooted in
property reaches results consistent with our intuitions and
with existing law. Donors who relinquish property rights in
their reproductive materials cannot become parents of the re-
sulting children regardless of how those children are con-
ceived.
The theory of intention-based parenthood is obviously at-
tractive. In at least some cases, almost everyone would agree
that the intentions of the parties should control.7" Indeed,
the intention-based model is far and away the most popular
academic position.7" But as the above discussion shows, its
the United States apparently was performed without the woman's awareness or
consent. See GENE COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 12 (Harper & Row Publish-
ers, Inc. 1985).
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. Whether the physician might have support obligations is a different
question.
72. Perhaps the most compelling cases are presented by nontraditional
family arrangements. Under current law, lesbian co-parents may have diffi-
culty defeating the parental claims of a known sperm donor who originally
agreed to avoid parental rights. See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356
(App. Div. 1994). Should the same lesbian couple later separate, the woman
without a biological connection to the child may have no rights at all to contin-
ued contact, despite a co-parenting agreement. See, e.g., In re Z.J.H., 471
N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991). See generally Tsippi Wray, Lesbian Relationships and
Parenthood: Models for Legal Recognition of Nontraditional Families, 21
HAMLINE L. REV. 127 (1997). These situations could, of course, be greatly sim-
plified by recognition of same-sex marriages.
73. In addition to the sources cited supra note 64, see, for example, Denise
E. Lascarides, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221 (1997); Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Le-
gal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187 (1986). If the
hegemony of the intent-based theory is less than total, it may be so only be-
cause the theory finds surrogacy contracts enforceable. See, e.g., Hill, supra
note 3. The approval of surrogacy creates a schism among the feminist theo-
rists: some maintain that intent-based parenthood nonetheless promotes gen-
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operation is theoretically dubious.
On a more practical level, states wishing to retain some
control over family arrangements might find the intention
model alarming. For example, a state might want to limit
the number of legally recognized parents to two, or set a
minimum age for non-coital parenthood.7' If intention is con-
ceded to be the trumping element of parenthood, restraining
parenthood within such a conceptual bound would seem to
require mind control: the state cannot simply refuse to honor
certain contracts, or prohibit certain actions, but must pre-
vent people from forming certain intentions, since it is inten-
tions (not contracts or actions) that determine who is a par-
ent. Proceeding on the basis of property rights, by contrast,
allows the state some room to regulate.75 For example, a
state may refuse to recognize multiple ownership of repro-
ductive material or the transfer of such material to persons
under a certain age.
None of this is to suggest that the intention model does
not usually reach desirable results. That it so often does is
undoubtedly a primary reason for its wide popularity." But
it does not follow that intention should be the basic concept of
our model. Intention may, and indeed should, be the ani-
mating spirit of our conception of parenthood, but without a
body of law to inhabit, it is a wandering ghost.
Recognizing this, most intention theorists turn to con-
tract law, for contract is the traditional legal vehicle for ex-
pressing intent. Yet contract law by itself is equally un-
der equality. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 64 (some find surrogacy unaccept-
able), and Radin, supra note 1, at 1932. For an insightful discussion of feminist
reactions to new reproductive technologies, see Linda J. Lacey, "0 Wind, Re-
mind Him That I Have No Child": Infertility and Feminist Jurisprudence, 5
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163 (1998). For a rare criticism of the invocation of in-
tent, see Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" Of Reproduction: Reproductive Technolo-
gies and the Parent-Child Bond, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1261 (1994).
74. Both these goals make some public policy sense. It might be in the best
interests of children to prevent the possibility of 20-person custody battles; it
surely is to prevent six-year-olds from being legal parents. The possibility of
pre-intercourse agreements about parental rights poses the same problem for a
state wishing to regulate family structure.
75. It has been suggested that state laws regulating assisted reproduction
may run afoul of the procreative liberty interest. See ROBERTSON, supra note
38, at 38-40; Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the
Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985). This is an immensely complex issue,
requiring first a stipulation of the meaning and scope of the right to procreate,
and is addressed in the context of particular reproductive technologies.
76. See supra note 75.
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availing because there is nothing that can be legally con-
tracted for to produce the desired results. Contracts for
transfer of parental rights are void and even criminal;77 that
is the purpose of baby-selling laws."8 The proponents of in-
tention-based parenthood do not suggest that sales of paren-
tal rights should be permitted. A standard surrogacy con-
tract providing that the intending parents will pay expenses
of pregnancy and that the surrogate will surrender the child
upon birth may be made, at least in some states, 79 and may
be evidence of intent, but this is not the same thing as using
contracts to determine in whom parental rights vest. A stan-
dard surrogacy contract does not contain any mechanism by
which parental rights vest in the intending parents, rather
than the surrogate. Nor does the intention model offer a
means by which this might be done. Because the intentional
model determines parenthood by looking to intent, fixing
parenthood by contract would seem to require a contract for a
certain intent. That is an unusual contract at best, and if the
surrogate secretly breaches it (she accepts payments but in-
tends all along to keep the child) no contract remedy can
change her intent nor, presumably, alter the fact that her in-
tent has made her a parent.
In order to allow contracts to determine the vesting of
original holders of parental rights, our analysis must start at
a different level. The problems created by the subjective and
invisible nature of intent are resolved by the conventions of
contract law, which tells us how to give intentions binding
force. Contract, in turn, operates within parameters set by
property law, which tells us what may be transferred, and by
whom. This issue-the extent of the ability to transfer prop-
erty rights in reproductive materials-is the proper focus of
the debate over nontraditional reproduction. If parental
rights are understood as flowing from property rights, then
contractual transfers of property will legally determine in
77. See, e.g., In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
78. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998) (refusing to en-
force surrogacy contract, comments that "[t]he statutory prohibition of payment
for receiving a child through adoption suggests that, as a matter of policy, a
mother's agreement to surrender custody in exchange for money (beyond preg-
nancy-related expenses) should be given no effect in deciding the custody of the
child"); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240-41 (N.J. 1988) (discussing New Jer-
sey baby-selling statute).
79. See R.R, 689 N.E.2d at 793-94 (discussing state surrogacy laws).
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whom the parental rights vest. This result allows intention
to have predictable legal effect and allows parties to collabo-
ratively arrange parental rights within clear limits set by the
states. Therefore, viewing parental rights as flowing from
property rights is the best way to fulfill the aspirations of the
intention model while recognizing the authority of the states
to regulate the creation of the family. The remainder of the
article argues that such a view is not only normatively desir-
able but also positively accurate.
IV. THE THEORY APPLIED: COITAL REPRODUCTION AND
EXISTING CASELAW
Part IV and Part V of this article argue that a property-
based understanding of parental rights provides the best way
to grapple with the issues presented by nontraditional repro-
ductive techniques. Part III has already suggested that such
an understanding avoids some of the theoretical difficulties of
the intention model. But normative appeal and theoretical
clarity are not, by themselves, enough. Whatever the attrac-
tions of a different understanding of parenthood might be,
they are unlikely to be persuasive if the understanding is
radically different from our customary approach. The claim
of this article has a positive dimension as well. Not only does
the property model provide the best path into the future, but
it furnishes the best understanding of the past. The tradi-
tional understanding of the origins of parental rights holds
that a mother's rights come from biology, and a father's from
relation to the mother." This part argues, to the contrary,
that both parents' rights stem from property.
A. Property and Parental Rights
The traditional understanding of parental rights derives
from two ancient principles, the presumption of biology, and
80. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Par-
enthood, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 642-644 (1993); Hill, supra note 3 at 370, 372
(stating that while pervasive legal principle provides that "the mother of the
child is the woman who bears the child," fatherhood "is a status accorded to
men who entertain certain kinds of relationships with the mother and the
child"); Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality:
Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60,
68 (1995) ("[U]nder the common law, a man's legal relationship to his offspring
was determined by his relationship to their mother.").
[Vol. 39
THE NEWEST PROPERTY
the presumption of legitimacy, which respectively determined
the parental rights of mothers and fathers. The presumption
of biology "reflects the ancient dictum 'mater est quam gesta-
tion demonstrat' (by gestation the mother is demonstrated)."8'
It is not clear from this phrasing whether the focus is on ge-
netic or gestational relationship, and it may even be won-
dered if the concept of genetic connection had an independent
existence. Historically, gestation proved genetic parentage
beyond doubt, so it was unnecessary to distinguish between
gestational and genetic mothers.
Because of its ambiguity, the historic principle can be
read to rely on either genetics or gestation. Courts have dif-
fered in their resolution of the issue in response to the mod-
ern ability to separate the two. Johnson v. Calvert2 held that
either genetics or gestation could be used to establish a
mother-child relationship and that intention should only be
invoked to break the tie.83 Belsito v. Clark,84 by contrast, held
that genetic contribution controlled and the egg donor had
exclusive maternal rights. Identifying with certainty
whether the presumption of biology is historically premised
on genetics or gestation may be impossible to do. However, a
sensible interpretation, which is consistent with either alter-
native, may be fashioned from a property-based understand-
ing.
On this account, the presumption is simply that the
woman who bears a child holds property rights in the em-
bryo at the beginning of gestation. This could be so either be-
cause the egg was originally hers, which would historically be
the case, or because an embryo had been given to her. The
growth of in vitro fertilization and surrogacy arrangements
has made the proposition that women gestate only their own
embryos less universally true. Appropriately, it has produced
a corresponding erosion of the presumption, as Johnson
shows.8 Johnson's use of the intentions of the parties, seen
81. Hill, supra note 3, at 370.
82. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1993).
83. The court found that both the ovum donor and the gestational host
qualified as mothers under the language of the California version of the Uni-
form Parentage Act and, refusing to hold that both had maternal rights,
awarded them to the egg provider. Id.
84. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio C.P. 1994).
85. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 (disclaiming reliance on evidentiary pre-
sumption).
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as intentions about the ownership interests in the embryo,
tallies well with this understanding. To recast Johnson's in-
tention-based analysis within the property framework: the
presumption is that the woman who bears a child holds prop-
erty rights in the embryo at the beginning of gestation. But
if the parties have arranged otherwise-if the surrogate has
received the embryo without gaining rights to it, as is clearly
the case in gestational surrogacy-Johnson will give legal ef-
fect to the actual arrangement despite the presumption. It is
thus relatively easy to see the presumption of biology in both
its historic and modern forms as providing for maternal
rights derived from property rights.
Paternal rights, at first glance, are somewhat harder to
assimilate into the property model. The presumption of le-
gitimacy awards paternal rights to the husband of the
woman who bears the child.86 Historically, the presumption
was irrebuttable and could not be defeated by the fact that
the husband was not present at the time of conception.87 Now
statutory, the presumption is still irrebuttable in some
states, and other states limit the parties who may offer re-
buttal. 88
This legal framework might suggest that paternal rights
are traditionally derived from social relationships, which
seems to be the dominant understanding.89 However, it is
equally plausible to see these paternal rights as derived from
property rights. Historically, the marital relation was under-
stood to merge man and wife-or rather, to merge the woman
into her husband." The doctrine of coverture rendered all of
the wife's property the husband's.9' It logically follows that a
husband would have property rights in his wife's eggs and
86. See In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1930). Though
couched in evidentiary terms, the presumption is better understood as a sub-
stantive rule of law determining legal paternity. See Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 119 (1989).
87. See In re Findlay, 170 N.E. at 472; Hill, supra note 3, at 372-74; Schiff,
supra note 58, at 529-30. An exception to the presumption existed where the
husband was impotent. This is hard to explain as anything other than a rule
that parental rights could not vest in an impotent man, but as such it is merely
a legal reflection of what would have been an historical fact.
88. See Hill, supra note 3, at 373; Schiff, supra note 58, at 530 n.20.
89. See supra note 82.
90. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 367 (Little, Brown & Company 3d
ed. 1993); Dolgin, supra note 73, at 645 n.33.
91. See Shanley, supra note 80, at 67-68.
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consequently parental rights to resulting children. Further-
more, the biological father of a child conceived by an adulter-
ous union would not have such rights. This result may be
understood as following from a rule that third parties are es-
topped from asserting their rights to genetic material ges-
tated by a married woman, or that paternal rights cannot
vest outside of marriage, or perhaps simply that parental
rights are derived solely from women's reproductive mate-
rial."
Policy considerations favoring the preservation of the
marital relationship and the avoidance of the stigma of ille-
gitimacy9" undoubtedly played a role in the construction of
the traditional legal framework, and I do not mean to claim
that the framework follows directly from property rules un-
shaped by such values. The point is simply that the inflexi-
ble laws of paternity were historically matched by, and can
be understood as consequences of, similarly strict laws con-
cerning marital property: if the wife's legal identity was ab-
sorbed by the husband's, her biological, and thus legal, chil-
dren would naturally be his legal children. We should not
accept the values that shaped the law of parental rights, but
we simply blind ourselves if we deny their role. "
The rigidity of the law with respect to paternity and
marital property has significantly decreased,95 and it might
be wondered whether the application of the property model is
limited to ancient regimes we have done well to overthrow.
Given the diverse status of the presumption of legitimacy in
the laws of the several states,9" it is impossible to maintain
that property law necessarily determines family law. That
92. These latter rules are suggested by the fact that at common law, ille-
gitimate children had no rights against their biological fathers and could not be
legitimized by their parents' subsequent marriage. Id. See also Stephen L.
Sass, The Defense of Multiple Access (Exception Plurium Concubentium) in Pa-
ternity Suits: A Comparative Analysis, 51 TUL. L. REV. 468, 498-99 (1991).
93. See Hill, supra note 3, at 372. These policy concerns may explain the
presumption of legitimacy for children born into a marriage; they do less to ex-
plain why men were shielded from all responsibility for children they sired out-
side a marriage. See Shanley, supra note 80, at 69.
94. See Shanley, supra note 80, at 67.
95. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 90, at 368 (discussing the Married
Women's Property Act); CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1991)
(repealed 1992) (allowing husband or wife to rebut presumption of legitimacy).
96. See supra note 86-88 and accompanying text.
97. An investigation of the relationship between state laws of paternity and
marital property might turn up interesting correlations, but is unnecessary to
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is not my contention. It suffices to note that the basis for a
property-derived understanding of the presumption of legiti-
macy still exists: spouses retain property rights in each
other's bodies.98
A more serious test for the property model is provided by
the recent case law concerning the rights of unwed fathers. A
line of Supreme Court cases culminating in Lehr v. Robert-
son99 holds that unmarried biological fathers do not automati-
cally enjoy full parental rights.
The significance of the biological connection is that it of-
fers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If
he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship .... 00
The children of biological fathers who do not grasp the
opportunity may constitutionally be adopted following only a
showing that such resolution is in the best interests of the
child.'01 Because adoption terminates parental rights, and
because parental rights may not constitutionally be termi-
the argument of this article and somewhat outside its scope. That such correla-
tions could exist does not seem implausible; reform in both areas is, if not
linked, likely driven by similar social forces.
98. For example, spouses have the primary right to donate each other's or-
gans after death. See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. 13-14
(Supp. 1990). An interesting consequence of the property model is that, given
the current state of marital property law, a "reverse" presumption of legitimacy
might apply. Historically, coverture gave husbands rights to their wives' prop-
erty but not the reverse; thus women did not have parental rights to their hus-
bands' illegitimate offspring. If the persistence of the presumption rests on the
fact that spouses have property rights in each other's bodies, the current mutu-
ality should imply that women are presumptive mothers to their husbands'
children by other women. This argument has been entertained, though skepti-
cally, by at least one court. See In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 893, 896-97
(Cal. App. 1994). The difficulty with it is that the presumption is nugatory if
rebuttable, and if conclusive it divests the other women of rights to property
within their bodies, which might well be unconstitutional. It deserves serious
consideration nonetheless, for it represents an analytical attempt to bring gen-
der equality to this area of the law, something this article will suggest is sorely
needed. See infra text accompanying notes 218-226; see also Buzzanca v. Buz-
zanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) (suggesting similarity between
artificial insemination and gestational surrogacy).
99. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). The earlier unwed father cases are Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
100. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
101. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254-56.
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nated without a showing of unfitness, °2 the best reading of
this line of cases is that unwed fathers who do not develop
relationships with their children never attain full constitu-
tionally protected parental rights."3
This legal regime might seem difficult to assimilate
within the property model. If a man has property rights in
his sperm,' and if parental rights flow from those property
rights, why should unwed fathers not enjoy full parental
rights? The answer, again hidden by the historic convergence
of gestation and biology, is that the parental rights that vest
at the beginning of gestation are only potential. Something
more is required to perfect them. After Lehr, this is clearly
the doctrine with respect to unwed fathers.' 5 What is not
generally noted, and obscured by the confluence of gestation
and genetics, is that this condition should, constitutionally,
apply equally to men and women.
This proposition has never been voiced by a court, and
might seem contrary to Lehr, which upheld a statute that
granted veto power in adoption proceedings to all illegitimate
mothers and only some putative fathers.0 6 Yet it seems a re-
quirement of equal protection.' ' Lehr is best understood as
resting on the implicit premise that states may provide that
gestation suffices to perfect parental rights. That is, a
mother's nine months carrying a child may constitute the
sort of "substantial relationship" that Lehr demands.' 8 Mar-
riage, less controversially, does the same for both spouses:
married parents each enjoy full parental rights, both at
common law and under the statutory regimes of most
states.0 9
102. See id. at 255.
103. See Hill, supra note 3, at 377-78.
104. The "biological connection" mentioned by the Lehr court is probably in-
telligible only as a property interest. If the connection is understood as a ge-
netic relationship, then unwed fathers' twins must have the same rights.
105. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
106. See id. at 266.
107. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979); cf. Lehr v. Rob-
ertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-68 (1983).
108. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267. This point was conceded arguendo by the Caban
majority, see 441 U.S. at 389, and explicitly put forth by the dissents. Caban,
441 U.S. at 398-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A test case for this reading of Lehr would require application of a gender-based
adoption consent distinction to an unwed couple that had procreated via gesta-
tional surrogacy.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
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The presumption of legitimacy and the unwed father
cases converge on the question of a man's rights with respect
to children he fathers with a married woman. In such cases,
an irrebuttable presumption might seem to deny the natural
father the ability to perfect his parental rights, even if he had
taken actions to perfect the "potential" parental rights de-
fined by Lehr.
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a
law denying the putative father the ability to rebut the pre-
sumption against procedural and substantive due process
challenges in Michael H. v. Gerald D.1° The failure of the
substantive due process claim is easily understood from the
property perspective. The law at issue simply prevented men
from asserting continued property rights in reproductive ma-
terial gestated by married women. Since even potential pa-
rental rights never vested in Michael, and since the law did
not broadly restrict his ability to procreate, no fundamental
right was at issue."'
An equal protection claim, which Michael did not raise,
is harder to dismiss, and the Colorado Supreme Court, in R.
McG., held a similar law unconstitutional on this ground."'
That court accepted the equal protection argument that the
statute discriminated by allowing natural mothers (the adul-
terous wives) but not putative natural fathers (their lovers)
to rebut the presumption."3 If the statute is understood as
working at the level of property,"" this argument is not over-
whelming. The state's interest in protecting the marital un-
ion is ample justification for preventing men from asserting
continued property rights. On this understanding, their pa-
rental rights never vest and are never violated. The state
may also allow the natural mother and presumed father
(and, under some statutes, the child) to hold the natural fa-
ther responsible by effectively allowing them to determine
whether he will be treated as a legal father.
The equal protection argument that has bite relies on a
110. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 253-255 (discussing procreative lib-
erty).
112. R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 670-72 (Colo. 1980); Traci Dallas, Note,
Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM
L. REV. 369, 379-80.
113. R. McG., 615 P.2d at 670-72.
114. See supra text accompanying note 111.
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comparison between betrayed wives and betrayed husbands.
These people are similarly situated in a way that the married
natural mothers and the unmarried natural fathers in R.
McG. were not."5 If the betrayed husband is presumed the
father of his wife's adulterously conceived children, there is a
question as to why the betrayed wife does not enjoy the same
presumption with respect to her husband's adulterously con-
ceived children. Where the woman with whom the straying
husband conceives the child is married, the answer may be
simple: in choosing between the two marriages, the state
minimizes disruption by leaving children with their gesta-
tional mothers. Where she is unmarried, the principle that
defeats the wife's claim (and, conversely, grants the unmar-
ried female lover parental rights but denies them to an un-
married man who conceives a child with a married woman) is
not obviously apparent.
1 6
Historically, the discrepancy in treatment is almost cer-
tainly due to the visible fact of gestation: it would have
seemed absurd for the law to provide that a wife who does
not conceive or give birth is the mother of a child conceived
and birthed by her husband's unmarried lover. This causal
explanation, however, does not suffice as a justification. If
the presumption of legitimacy prevents parental rights from
vesting in the first place, as I have argued, then the fact of
gestation is irrelevant. This is so because the effect of gesta-
tion, as I have analyzed it, is merely to perfect existing pa-
rental rights; gestation, by itself, does not create the rights.
The best justification, which is not necessarily an entirely
satisfactory one, is that a woman conceiving with a married
man retains her reproductive material within her body. For
parental rights not to vest in her, she must be deprived of
rights to biological property within her body as a consequence
of conceiving with a married man-an approach whose con-
stitutionality must be doubtful.1 7 Conversely, a rule which
115. See supra text accompanying notes 112-113.
116. The differential in treatment is not insignificant. It appears even more
starkly when the status of the lovers of adulterous spouses is compared. Here,
the rule allows women but not men to exercise parental rights to children con-
ceived with married partners. In addition, where both progenitors are unmar-
ried, the woman may prevent the man from attaining parental rights simply by
marrying another man before the child is born. See U.P.A. § 4(a)(1), 9B U.L.A.
298 (1987).
117. This sort of expropriation is in some ways quite similar to the stomach
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provides that men constructively abandon sperm to married
women does not divest them of rights to property within their
own bodies and, therefore, is not as constitutionally repug-
nant."'
The above discussion certainly raises as many questions
as it answers. The interaction of the presumptions of biology
and legitimacy with modern techniques of reproduction is
complex and will be analyzed in detail below. The aim of this
part has been merely to argue that the existing legal treat-
ment of coital reproduction is well explained by the property
model of parental rights. The next test for the property
model is its application to new reproductive techniques.
V. THE THEORY APPLIED: NONTRADITIONAL REPRODUCTION
The law governing nontraditional reproduction is unset-
tled. This is to be expected, given the novelty of the tech-
niques employed. The lack of uniformity in the law makes it
impossible to argue that current legal treatment is best un-
derstood as hewing to any particular understanding of par-
enthood. Therefore, the article now takes a normative tack,
analyzing the issues posed by the new reproductive technolo-
gies from the perspective of the property model. In some in-
stances, this produces clear legal results. In most instances,
however, it merely suggests results that should be obtained
in the absence of state regulation. I do not intend to enter
the policy debate concerning the value and advisability of
such regulation, although I do note constitutional concerns
and discuss the form that such regulation must take.
A. Artificial Insemination
Artificial insemination is the oldest technique of non-
pumping condemned by Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and might
qualify as sufficiently conscience-shocking to warrant substantive due process
protection. From the perspective of constitutional family law, substantive due
process has less to offer. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989),
suggests that its protection is limited to "the relationships that develop within
the unitary family." This would seem to exclude the relationship of an unmar-
ried woman to a child conceived with a married man.
118. On this account, the wife of an adulterous husband would have a claim
to parental rights to his children by an unmarried woman. Given that these
rights would be derivative of his property rights in his sperm, it is not surpris-
ing that the unmarried woman's primary rights in her egg could defeat the
wife's.
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coital reproduction. 9 Despite its long history, however, the
law governing the rights of donors and recipients is far from
uniform. Much turns on the marital status of the recipient,
and this factor provides a convenient disjunctive framework
for analysis.
1. Married Recipients
Where the semen recipient is married, the Uniform Par-
entage Act 2 ° (UPA), and fifteen state laws,'"' provide that if
the insemination is performed under the supervision of a li-
censed physician and with the consent of the husband, the
husband is deemed the father of any resulting children. The
donor retains neither rights nor obligations of parenthood.'
The more recent Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Con-
ception Act (USCACA),12" ' and fifteen other state laws ,1 di-
rect the same result and omit the requirement of physician
supervision. The husband may avoid legal fatherhood only
by filing an action within two years of learning of the child's
birth and showing that he did not consent to the insemina-
tion.' This is roughly similar to what would be produced by
the presumption of legitimacy in the absence of any specific
legislative directive.' 6 Since the presumption itself is intelli-
gible in the property model,' this treatment of artificial in-
semination is as well. Legislatively granting the husband pa-
ternal rights also seems to be sound policy: if he has
119. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1306 (Conn. 1998). Artificial in-
semination is a procedure in which sperm is introduced into a woman's cervical
canal or uterus by non-coital means.
120. U.P.A. § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
121. See Comment to UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CON-
CEPTION ACT (U.S.C.A.C.A.) § 4, 9B U.L.A. 189 (West Supp. 1997).
122. U.P.A. § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
123. 9B U.L.A. 186 (West Supp. 1997).
124. Comment to U.S.C.A.C.A. § 4, 9B U.L.A. 189 (West Supp. 1997).
125. U.S.C.A.C.A. § 3, 9B U.L.A. 188 (West Supp 1997). Section four pro-
vides that donors are not parents of children resulting from assisted conception.
Id. § 4.
126. One distinction is that only a nonconsenting husband possesses the ef-
fective power to rebut the presumption. The more significant discrepancy is
that even if the husband does not consent, the donor holds neither rights nor
responsibilities. See U.S.C.A.C.A. § 4, 9B U.L.A. 189 (West Supp. 1997). This
treatment of donors maybe understood to reflect a presumption that donors in-
tend to alienate their reproductive material. The wisdom of converting this
presumption into a substantive rule of law unalterable by contract is question-
able.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.
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consented to the insemination, reasons for denying him pa-
rental status are difficult to conjure. More difficult issues
arise in cases featuring unmarried recipients.
2. Unmarried Recipients
The USCACA denies parental rights and obligations to
donors regardless of the marital status of recipients."8 Only
fifteen states have adopted this broad avoidance of pater-
nity,'29 and some courts have taken the very different tack of
analyzing conflicts between donors and recipients as though
conception had taken place by intercourse. ° In Jhordan C.
v. Mary K, 3 for example, the California Court of Appeals
held that the parties' intentions were irrelevant and that the
donor was the child's legal father because the semen had not
been provided to a licensed physician, as required by the
California statute. The court in Thomas S. v. Robin Y.' 3
similarly granted an order of filiation to a donor over the re-
cipient's objections despite an agreement that the donor
would have no parental rights or obligations. 3' Leckie v.
Voorhees,34 by contrast, held that parties' express intentions
to avoid donor parental rights are to be given effect.'
The ability of parties to contract around laws avoiding
donors' rights is another area of doctrinal uncertainty, al-
though the tendency is to uphold such agreements. In In re
R.C., '3 the Colorado Supreme Court honored the parties' in-
tentions, reasoning that the legislature had not intended to
prevent contractual stipulation. McIntyre v. Crouch went so
far as to hold that a law preventing donors from obtaining
parental rights would be unconstitutional as applied to a do-
nor who had contracted for such rights.'37
The above issues are not very difficult if the property
128. See U.S.C.A.C.A. § 4, 9B U.L.A. 189 (West Supp. 1997).
129. See supra notes 123-124.
130. See Schiff, supra note 58, at 538-39.
131. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
132. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
133. See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1993). The New
York Supreme Court did not discuss the agreement and persistently charac-
terized the issue as one of termination of parental rights. See 618 N.Y.S.2d at
300-01.
134. Leckie v. Voorhees, 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
135. Id. at 521-23.
136. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989).
137. McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 244 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
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model is applied. The only important fact to keep in mind is
that statutes and contracts regarding donor's rights deter-
mine in whom parental rights vest; they do not transfer or
terminate rights.'38 Given that such contracts do not attempt
something that states have forbidden," 9 they should gener-
ally be effective. To achieve the desired results, they need
only specify who holds property rights in the reproductive
materials, and this is just a garden-variety contract of sale.
For much the same reason, however, statutes that dictate re-
sults unalterable by contract will likely withstand constitu-
tional challenges. Such statutes merely provide non-
waivable rules of property, and given that these rules usually
allow the parties ample means to effect their procreative in-
tent, they do not unduly burden procreative liberty.4 '
The wisdom of statutory rules that cannot be avoided by
contract is another question. Those statutes that limit the
power of contract typically do so by conditioning parental
status on the presence or absence of a physician. If the
sperm is provided to a physician, the donor is not considered
the father; if not, he is.'4 Assuming that most donors do not
desire parental status, this might encourage the use of a phy-
sician. But scholars tend to believe that physician involve-
ment serves no medical purpose, "2 and in reality most in-
138. See Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Ellerin, J., dissenting). See also
supra text accompanying note 53.
139. See supra text accompanying note 55.
140. See infra Part V.C.1. Defining the scope of the procreative liberty inter-
est is obviously essential to an examination of the constitutional questions
posed by state laws assigning parental status. Supreme Court decisions, nota-
bly Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972), suggest a fundamental right to decide whether to "bear or
beget a child." The separability of different components of the procreative
process forces us to ask which are the fundamental elements of the right; I
shall argue that the right is in essence the right to decide whether or not to
create a child of whom one is a legal parent.
From this perspective, the laws at issue in Jhordan C. and McIntyre are
constitutional because they do not prevent any person from making the choice;
they merely prescribe procedures that determine legal consequences. The
Jhordan C. statute allowed for avoidance of donor rights by doctor supervision;
the McIntyre statute allowed for retention by coital reproduction. The McIntyre
statute would be unconstitutional as applied to a man who could not reproduce
coitally but could donate sperm; this, however, was not the case. Further is-
sues, notably the relationship between the rights of privacy and procreation,
are considered as they arise.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 120-122.
142. See Schiff, supra note 58, at 545-49.
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seminations take place without a doctor's supervision."
Given these two facts, requiring physician participation to
avoid donor rights seems to amount simply to a trap for the
unwary. Conversely, the purpose behind preventing donors
from retaining rights when the sperm is provided to a physi-
cian is obscure. It is hard to imagine what interest the state
might have in preventing men from becoming fathers by in-
semination rather than by coitus. These are, however, sim-
ply policy questions, and their resolution does not turn on a
particular understanding of parental rights.
The more serious problem created by the use of artificial
insemination centers on its use by nontraditional families-
notably, lesbian co-parents.4 The fact that same-sex mar-
riages are not legally recognized hampers lesbian co-parents
faced with filiation actions by sperm donors.'45 Care in the
arrangement of the insemination should be able to avoid the
donor's rights reliably.'46 The more intractable problem is
that the unavailability of marriage also prevents parental
rights from vesting in the unrelated partner.147 The conse-
quence of this is that only the biological mother is a legal
parent, and the non-recipient's rights upon the dissolution of
the relationship may be quite limited. Nancy S. v. Michelle
G. ' featured a custody battle between a lesbian couple. Two
children had been conceived by artificial insemination, and
the court, holding that the biological mother was the only le-
gal parent, affirmed a decision awarding her sole custody.149
Existing law offers few options for lesbian couples trying
143. See Comment to U.S.C.A.C.A. § 4, 9B U.L.A. 190 (West Supp. 1997)
(noting that requirement of physician involvement "is not realistic in light of
present practices in the field of artificial insemination").
144. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459 (1990).
145. See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 559 N.Y.S.2d 377, 377 (Fam. Ct. 1993).
146. At least one commentator has suggested that the relationships of
"involved donors" should be accorded some measure of legal protection against
the wishes of lesbian co-parents. See Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers... and a Sperm Donor with Visitation Rights, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOCIAL CHANGE 1 (1996). The fair way to evaluate this proposal, I suggest, is
to imagine it applied to a married heterosexual couple.
147. See, e.g., Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and
Lesbian Family Values by a "Simulacrum of Marriage", 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
1699 (1998).
148. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991).
149. See Id.
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to give legal effect to a mutual parenting agreement.' They
may endure unnecessary medical procedures to allow one
partner to gestate the other's fertilized egg, although the le-
gal consequences are uncertain.' They may also arrange for
the adoption of the child by the unrelated partner, and such
arrangements have been held to create joint parental
rights.5 2 The property model allows a substantially simpler
route to vesting parental rights in both partners: the unre-
lated partner can simply obtain property rights in the donor's
semen. 5 ' Recognizing parental rights as derived from prop-
erty rights allows certainty and simplicity in effectuating the
intentions of lesbian co-parents.
150. These may take the form of contracts attempting to allocate rights in
case of the dissolution of a relationship, see, e.g., Sporleder v. Hermes, 471
N.W.2d 202, 211 (Wis. 1991) (holding co-parenting contract void), or they may
be more informal understandings. In Holztmann v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 434
(Wis. 1995), the court partially overruled Sporleder, holding that courts may
exercise their equitable powers to grant visitation rights on the basis of a co-
parenting agreement. This is still a far cry from granting such agreements le-
gal effect.
151. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), held that gestation and
biological relation both sufficed to establish a mother-child relationship, and
that intention must be considered to break the parity. If the parties' intentions
were that both should have parental rights, a court might so find. But see Bel-
sito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio C.P. 1994) (holding biological relationship
dispositive in gestational surrogacy case).
152. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. and B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995);
In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995).
153. The ability of an unmarried woman to purchase donor sperm for in-
semination is not absolutely established, although it has been suggested that
restrictions are unconstitutional. See generally Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism
Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial In-
semination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUDIES 173 (1996). In
cases where a lesbian couple is trying to arrange parental rights, however, that
hurdle has obviously been crossed. In such situations, there is no clear reason
not to treat a woman in possession of donor sperm as a donor if she then pro-
vides the sperm to her partner. If men can provide sperm to women and ar-
range to avoid or retain parental rights by contract, equal protection demands
an explanation for why women cannot as well. One answer would be a state
policy against two-mother families, but such arrangements are relatively wide-
spread, as the mere existence of the lesbian co-parent cases demonstrates. The
effect of the discrimination is thus merely to create an imbalance of legal power
within such families-hardly a substantial state interest. The property model,
of course, suggests that such women should be treated exactly as male donors.
One of the most interesting consequences of new reproductive technologies is
that they reduce the effect of the traditional sex roles imposed by biology and
offer the possibility of true gender-neutrality in law. Cf. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca,
72 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that gestational surrogacy pro-
vides "no reason to distinguish between husband and wife").
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The principle of effectuating the parties' intentions leads
to the overwhelming question of artificial insemination: why
should it be treated differently from sexual reproduction?
Here again, I will argue, the property model explains the ex-
isting law better than its competitors and gives both states
and private parties greater ability to produce predictable le-
gal results.
3. Distinguishing Coitus
What distinguishes intercourse from artificial insemina-
tion? In the majority of cases, artificial insemination is un-
dertaken with the intention that the donor shall have no pa-
rental rights, and intercourse is not."' If this is the relevant
distinction, however, then the different legal consequences
are simply a matter of effectuating intent, and parties should
be able to provide otherwise by contract. However, while
sperm donors have had some success in asserting parental
rights provided for by contract,'55 male partners to inter-
course have uniformly failed in similar contractual attempts
to avoid parental status, as the next paragraph discusses.
That seems the correct result; allowing men to do so would
seriously undermine the principle that support obligations
are non-waivable. Therefore, this section argues that the
property model provides states with theoretically sound
methods of combating agreements designed to avoid parental
obligations.
Cases thus far have not presented the strongest fact pat-
terns. In Straub v. Todd,"5 6 the couple engaged in a sexual
and emotional relationship both before and after the child's
154. With respect to artificial insemination, U.S.C.A.C.A. § 4 codifies the
tendency by providing that, as a general rule, donors are not treated as par-
ents. With respect to intercourse, people often intend not to produce children,
but less often intend to produce children of which they are not the parents. The
common sense psychological intuition underlying both tendencies is that
women who wish to have a child are more likely to want to conceive through
intercourse if the prospective biological father is someone with whom they in-
tend to raise the child. This would certainly be true, for example, with women
married to infertile men; they are likely to prefer artificial insemination to in-
tercourse with a donor. The tendencies are of course not universal. See, e.g., In
re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (artificial insemination with alleged agreement
retaining parental rights); Straub v. Todd, 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994)
(intercourse with written nonsupport agreement).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 136-137.
156. 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994).
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birth. Todd (the woman) wanted a child, and when Straub
demurred, she secured his cooperation by signing an agree-
ment stipulating that he would "not be held responsible fi-
nancially or emotionally."'57 In Estes v. Albers,158 the parties
were friends, and the man agreed to father a child after the
woman orally promised not to hold him responsible for sup-
port. He never attempted to deny legal parentage and in fact
stipulated it on several occasions.'9 On their facts, then,
both cases were relatively easy: contracts eliminating support
obligations are void as against public policy.' ° The harder
question arises where the agreement purports to prevent pa-
rental rights from vesting.
Neither Straub nor Estes necessarily resolved the issue
of whether a male partner to intercourse can avoid parental
rights, but both men argued that they should have the legal
status of sperm donors.161 Both courts emphatically rejected
the argument, although it is not clear whether their stated
reasons suffice to support a general rule preventing coital
partners from avoiding parental rights. Estes was an espe-
cially easy case because the man had stipulated to parental
status; this fact will generally not be present.
In Straub, the Indiana Supreme Court mustered three
arguments to support its result. First, Indiana had no stat-
ute regulating the rights and obligations of sperm donors,
and the parties had not complied with the physician involve-
ment provision of the UPA.'62 This argument provides slen-
der support for a general rule because many states have
eliminated the requirement of physician involvement, and
some have allowed parties to contract around a statute im-
posing such a requirement. Second, the Straub court found
that the agreement was "nothing more than paper-shuffling
to achieve ... deprivation of support."'63 This argument can
as easily be applied to sperm donation: a couple may have a
relationship of any sort, apart from marriage, and still ar-
range for the man to have no support obligations for a child
157. Id. at 598.
158. Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607 (S.D. 1993).
159. Id. at 608-09.
160. See Straub, 645 N.E.2d at 599-600; Estes, 504 N.W.2d at 609.
161. Straub, 645 N.E.2d at 599; Estes, 504 N.W.2d at 609.
162. Straub, 645 N.E.2d at 601.
163. Id. at 601 n.9.
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conceived by insemination. Third, the court noted that inter-
course served as consideration for the agreement, a tradi-
tional ground for holding a contract void."' This is not read-
ily apparent from the facts of the case, and could certainly be
avoided in future cases by a well drafted contract: a woman
could, for example, pay for the sperm.
A final argument, which has been used to reject claims of
"contraception fraud," is that some conduct is so intensely
private that courts should not intrude."' In a number of
cases, men have tried (with no success) to avoid support obli-
gations,"" and even to recover punitive damages,"' on the
grounds that women lied to them about their use of contra-
ception. The courts' refusal to intervene is a consequence of
the privacy of intercourse."8 The problem with this argu-
ment, as applied to pre-intercourse agreements about paren-
tal status, is that artificial insemination, involving the deci-
sion "to bear or beget a child," is equally private from a
constitutional perspective.'69 If courts may not "intrude" to
enforce contracts providing that men shall have no parental
rights to children produced by intercourse, it is hard to see
how they may do so to enforce such contracts with respect to
artificial insemination. Conversely, given that they can do so
with artificial insemination, it seems clear that constitutional
privacy cannot prevent them from doing so with respect to in-
tercourse.
Existing law thus seems to provide no theoretically ade-
quate barrier to such agreements. Indeed, on the intention
model, states would be powerless to avoid their legal effect.
Even if unenforceable on public policy grounds, a contract
purporting to avoid parental rights is good evidence of intent,
and if intent is fundamental, it determines in whom the
rights vest. The property model, by contrast, provides states
with several methods of rendering such agreements ineffec-
tual.
First, a state could provide that property inside the body
164. Id. at 601.
165. See Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
166. See, e.g., Smith v. Price, 328 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Hughes v.
Hutt, 455 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1983).
167. See Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
168. See Stephen K, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
169. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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is inalienable.' This would prevent men from transferring
property rights to semen in their bodies, and parental rights
would vest in them at conception. This is a broad rule with
far-reaching and perhaps undesirable consequences, as the
discussion of surrogacy will show.' Second, states could dic-
tate that delivery of semen to unmarried women via inter-
course is ineffective as a transfer of property rights. This
rule would be the converse of that applicable to married
women under the presumption of legitimacy.'72 Finally, state
law could stipulate that transfer of semen via intercourse is
effective as to parental rights, but that the original owner re-
tains liability for support. This rule, the most narrowly tai-
lored to the state interest in ensuring support, may seem odd
in its separation of rights and liabilities. But there is no ob-
vious policy reason to prevent parties from divesting them-
selves of the rights. Furthermore, the retention of liability
without ownership exists in our law already, for example, in
the treatment of environmental liability under CERCLA.' 7'
Again, I make no argument as to the wisdom of these several
approaches. The claim is simply that the property model al-
lows clarity and predictability in the determination of parties'
rights, and permits states to pursue policy objectives better
than existing alternatives.
B. Surrogacy
Surrogacy contracts provide for the gestation of an em-
bryo by a woman who promises to surrender the child at
birth to the intending parents. Ordinary surrogacy arrange-
ments feature artificial insemination of the surrogate with
sperm from the husband of the intending family.'74 Gesta-
tional surrogacy involves in vitro fertilization of an embryo
and implantation in a surrogate who has no genetic connec-
tion to the resulting child.'75 Many different permutations of
170. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 936 (1982) (arguing that it is appropriate "to call parts of the body property
only after they have been removed from the system").
171. See infra text accompanying notes 189-192.
172. See supra text accompanying note 111.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (West 1994) (extending potential liability to past
owners of facilities disposing of hazardous substances).
174. See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, The Book of 'A', 70 TEX. L. REV. 971, 999
(1992).
175. See id.
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these models are imaginable, depending on the sources of the
gametes and the marital status of the surrogate and intend-
ing parent(s).'76 This discussion will focus on the ordinary ar-
rangement.
The cramping effect of non-waivable rules about parental
rights becomes immediately apparent when surrogacy is
compared to artificial insemination. The same rules that
honor the parties' intentions in the ordinary artificial in-
semination case-by avoiding the donor's rights and award-
ing parental status to the recipient's husband' 77 -thwart
them in the ordinary surrogacy case.
To some extent, these consequences can be avoided
within the existing legal framework. The husbands of mar-
ried surrogates can execute affidavits of non-consent, and in-
tending fathers can contractually provide for parental
rights.'78 However, parties attempting to determine parental
rights by contract encounter difficulties with two further as-
pirations of surrogacy agreements. Under current law, they
cannot prevent parental rights from vesting in a biologically
related surrogate,'79 and they cannot cause rights to vest in
an intending mother that does not provide the gametes.8 °
These two limitations on the efficacy of contract become im-
portant in two distinct cases: (1) conflicts between the surro-
gate and the intending parents and (2) conflicts between the
intending parents after performance of the surrogacy con-
tract.
One important point must be made before beginning the
analysis of these two conflicts. My intent is to examine the
legal consequences of a surrogacy contract from the property
176. For a few examples, the gamete providers could be anonymous donors.
The intending parents could be a single man or woman, or a gay couple.
177. See U.S.C.A.C.A. §§ 3,4; 9B U.L.A. 188 (Supp 1998).
178. See McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 244 (Or. App. 1989) (law pre-
venting a donor's contractual retention of rights unconstitutional). In re Adop-
tion of Matthew B.-M., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Ct. App. 1991), reached the same con-
clusion in the context of a surrogacy agreement. I believe these cases are
wrongly decided, as discussed supra note 96, but they show that donors have
some ability to retain rights within the existing legal regime.
179. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
180. See Moschetta v. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994). Ges-
tational surrogacy agreements appear to have different legal consequences. If
the intending parents are the gamete providers, Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776 (Cal. 1993), and Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio C.P. 1994), held that
they are the legal parents.
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model, which I believe is the best way to understand current
law. The conclusions that I reach are not intended as norma-
tive prescriptions, for I maintain an agnostic stance about the
wisdom of permitting surrogacy. However, the property
model serves to clarify the issues and suggests the form that
restrictions should take.
1. Intending Parent-Surrogate Conflicts
a. Surrendering the Child
The most salient locus of conflict between the surrogate
and the intending parents is the surrogate's promise to sur-
render the child. The USCACA offers two alternatives for re-
solving such disputes. The first alternative provides that the
surrogate retains the right to revoke the agreement without
liability during the first 180 days of pregnancy.' Upon re-
cantation, the rights of the parties are determined without
reference to the surrogacy agreement, and the surrogate and
the sperm provider will be the legal parents. The second al-
ternative simply provides that surrogacy agreements are void
in their entirety."'
No court has yet enforced a surrogacy agreement,'83 and
only two states have passed laws making them enforceable."4
While surrogacy has been the subject of widespread condem-
nation, 85 a number of commentators, especially those favor-
ing the intention model of parental rights, take the position
that the claims of the intending parents should have priority
over those of a surrogate. 88
181. U.S.C.A.C.A. § 5A. This right belongs only to surrogates who provide
the egg.
182. U.S.C.A.C.A. § 5B.
183. Cases holding surrogacy contracts unenforceable include the famous
cases In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790
(Mass. 1998), and In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Fam. Ct. 1990).
184. New Hampshire and Virginia recognize surrogacy contracts. See N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B: 20 to 168-B: 28 (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
159 (Michie 1993). However, approval of such contracts is a minority position.
See generally Christine L. Kerian,. Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for In-
fertile Women or a Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WiS.
WOMEN'S L. J., 113, 142-50 (1997) (discussing legislative responses).
185. See, e.g., Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground
for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 127 (1986); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497
(1983); Radin, supra note 1.
186. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 131; Hill, supra note 3; Shultz,
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Those arguing for the enforcement of surrogacy contracts
face an immediately troubling dichotomy. Either the contract
is for personal services or it is a contract for sale; it is hard to
imagine any other characterization of a deal whereby the
surrogate gestates and delivers a baby. If it is a service con-
tract, it is not specifically enforceable, and a surrogate who
announces her intention to breach and repudiates the con-
tract cannot be forced to surrender the baby if she carries it
to term.187 If it is a contract for sale, it appears that it must
be for the sale of a baby (or, more accurately, of parental
rights), which is not only unenforceable, it is illegal.'88
This disjunctive difficulty highlights the shortcomings of
the intention model. Arguing that intention should deter-
mine parental status is well and good, but when the ways to
implement intention are criminal or ineffectual, aspirations
are unavailing. There is simply no way to produce the de-
sired result.
. The property model approaches the problem from a
slightly different perspective. If parental rights are deter-
mined by antecedent property rights, then the parties hold-
ing rights in the gametes at the beginning of gestation are
the parents. If the surrogate can transfer her rights in the
egg, presumably to the intending mother, then the intending
parents will be the legal parents. Given this, the contract
must be a personal service contract for gestation, since pa-
rental rights vest initially in the intending parents and are
never transferred. There can be no question of baby-selling,
since the child is simply given to its legal parents. Specific
performance would not be needed as a remedy for the surro-
gate's refusal to turn over the child; retention would be kid-
napping and criminal law would intervene. Repudiation of
the contract by either party would not alter the allocation of
parental rights since these would be fixed at the beginning of
gestation. In short, absent some rule preventing such a
supra note 64.
187. This conclusion may not be obvious. The reasoning is as follows. The
surrogate's personal service contract may not be specifically enforced. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1981). Therefore if she an-
nounces a breach, her obligation to perform is eliminated and replaced with the
obligation to pay damages for breach, since that is the only remedy available. If
she then "performs" anyway but does not offer the performance as a cure for
breach, the performance cannot be claimed by the intending parents.
188. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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property transfer, surrogacy contracts should have full legal
effect in determining parental rights.
All this depends on the ability of the surrogate to trans-
fer rights to her egg. Such transfers are relatively uncontro-
versial in the case of egg donors, but the surrogate is differ-
ent-not because she gestates the egg, which by itself gives
her no rights, but because the egg never leaves her body. The
legal effect of a surrogacy contract thus turns on the al-
ienability of property within the body.
This is a basic question, but it must not be misconstrued.
Allowing alienation of property inside the body would not
permit alienation of biological property that has been pro-
nounced inalienable. It would not allow the sale of any body
parts that are not already freely transferable. It would
merely allow the transfer of rights to take place without
separating the property from the body.
There are policy concerns on both sides. Denying legal
effect to transfers of property within the body is one way, as
discussed above, to distinguish between intercourse and
sperm donation. It also provides a convenient way to limit
the effect of surrogacy agreements and, given the differential
in treatment of gestational and ordinary surrogacy, seems to
be the current state of the law.189 However, it produces some
unpalatable results. The consequence of allowing transfers of
property rights to take place only outside the body is to grant
legal effect only to gestational surrogacy arrangements, or
ones in which an egg-providing surrogate submits to unnec-
essary egg extraction (via laproscopy) and embryo implanta-
tion.9° The policy reasons for creating incentives to such ar-
rangements are opaque, and those opposing such
arrangements would do better to advocate the prohibition of
surrogacy entirely. Therefore, the rest of this article assumes
that property inside the body is alienable."'
189. Compare Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (ruling that in-
tending mother is legal mother of child born via gestational surrogacy), with
R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (ruling that surrogate is legal
mother of child born via ordinary surrogacy).
190. No case has featured this fact-pattern, and quite probably a court would
treat it no differently from ordinary surrogacy. That this would be theoretically
hard to justify makes it no less likely.
191. One concern about alienability of property inside the body is that it
might allow for effective pre-birth adoptions. If early embryos are property,
purchasers of such an embryo, even inside a woman, might seem to obtain pa-
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b. Abortion
The second, and fortunately more rare, potential area of
conflict between intending parents and a surrogate is the
abortion decision. Two questions are presented: (1) whether
the surrogate may contract away her right to abortion and (2)
whether the intending parents have a remedy against a sur-
rogate who gets an abortion.
Analyzing the issue of the alienability of the abortion
right requires a preliminary investigation into the nature of
the right. The following paragraphs attempt first to define
the contours of the right, since it is only once we know what
would be surrendered that we may ask whether it may be.
The right to an abortion stems from the right to privacy; Roe
v. Wade held that the right of privacy "is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."9 ' Privacy is itself a concept of a certain mystery.
It protects individuals from certain types of governmental in-
trusions, but the methods of identifying impermissible intru-
sions are notoriously elusive.'93 Privacy is perhaps best un-
derstood as a right not to have government require certain
types of behavior-those that "inform the totality of a per-
son's life."'94 The right to abortion exists, then, because forc-
ing a woman to bear a child is "a totalitarian intervention
into a woman's life."195
Privacy obviously encompasses more than abortion; most
significant for this discussion, it guarantees a cluster of re-
lated rights centering around the creation of the family. 96
Procreative liberty is also an aspect of privacy. Yet it is an
rental rights. This result would be contrary to law and to intuition; it is no
more than thinly-disguised baby-selling. That it so resembles baby-selling sug-
gests what I have proposed: that the distribution of property rights at the be-
ginning of gestation determines in whom parental rights vest. Embryos, even
implanted embryos may be property, but purchasing property in the womb can-
not alter parental rights.
192. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
193. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 750-82
(1989) (critiquing existing accounts of privacy doctrine).
194. Id. at 783.
195. Id. at 790.
196. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (recognizing rights
to conceive and raise children); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(recognizing the right to decide "whether to bear or beget a child"); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 393 (1923) (discussing rights to "marry, establish a
home, and bring up children").
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aspect that is analytically distinct from the abortion right.'97
Procreative liberty speaks to individuals' ability to exercise
choice with respect to procreation; the abortion right relates
only to freedom from the servitude imposed by mandatory
childbearing.'98 The distinction is important because were
the abortion right merely an aspect of procreative liberty, the
right might be adequately vindicated by a legal regime that
prohibited abortion but allowed termination of parental
rights and responsibilities. For example, if procreative lib-
erty alone were at issue, a surrogate (who is not the legal
parent) would have no claim that her liberty was infringed by
denying her an abortion.9
The important consequence of this analysis for abortion
is that the abortion right is a right to avoid gestation, not
parenthood; to separate from the embryo, not to destroy it.
The abortion right prevents the state from conscripting
women's bodies into childbearing; if the state does not re-
quire gestation, it does not infringe that particular right.
Destruction follows separation, but if separation could be
achieved without destruction, proscribing destruction would
not trench on the abortion right. There are still privacy con-
cerns, on Rubenfeld's account; if the state required the
woman to accept parental status it would similarly impose on
her a role informing the totality of her life. 200 This privacy
violation, however, goes to procreative liberty; the state has
prevented the woman from exercising choice about becoming
a parent. Prohibiting destruction by a surrogate, however,
would not raise an issue of privacy, even in its procreative
liberty aspect, since the surrogate is not required to accept
parental status.
This may have been conceptually rough going, but we are
now in a position to consider the alienability of the abortion
197. See infra Part V.C.I.
198. See ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 22-23 (distinguishing between pro-
creative liberty and "liberty in the conduct of pregnancy"); Rubenfeld, supra
note 193, at 790 (discussing abortion right); see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988) ("The right to procreate ... is the right to have natural
children, whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination."). The
distinction appears most sharply in the Supreme Court's invalidation of spousal
notification laws. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895-98
(1992). If the abortion right depended on procreative liberty, it would be shared
between the parents, rather than being exclusively the woman's decision.
199. The same is true, a fortiori, of gestational surrogates.
200. Rubenfeld, supra note 193 at 788-90.
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right, and the analysis above will prove its worth. Allowing
surrogates to contract away their right to abortion would en-
list the coercive machinery of the state in the project of com-
pelling them to bear children. This is a privacy violation, ac-
cording to both Supreme Court precedent and the
understanding of privacy developed above.'O° More obviously,
a state's specific enforcement of a personal services contract
violates the Thirteenth Amendment as construed in Bailey v.
Alabama."2 As a matter of constitutional law, a surrogate's
promise not to abort cannot be specifically enforced.' But,
given the narrow scope of the abortion right, this is subject
to technological change. Intending parents may not force a
surrogate to continue her pregnancy, but if it becomes possi-
ble to terminate the pregnancy without destroying the fetus,
a contract provision specifying that alternative would be en-
forceable.
The second issue is whether intending parents may re-
cover damages from a surrogate who aborts. That surrogates
have an inalienable constitutional right to end their pregnan-
cies does not necessarily imply that an action for damages
cannot exist. Individuals who enter into a personal services
contract generally have a constitutional right not to perform;
Bailey will prevent a state from using its criminal law to
compel them to render services. However, this does not
shield them from liability for breaching.
A distinction must be made at this point. Intending par-
ents could seek damages on two grounds. First, they could
simply sue in contract for failure to perform. While their
ability to do so is hard to deny, the difficulty comes in the cal-
201. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra text accompanying
notes 192-195.
202. 219 U.S. 219, 238-44 (1911). For an argument that the abortion right
flows directly from the Thirteenth Amendment, see Andrew Koppelman, Forced
Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 N.W. U. L. REV. 480
(1990). If Koppelman is correct, then the right is clearly inalienable.
203. The Thirteenth Amendment argument has been canvassed in Surrogate
Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, Note, 16
U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 470 (1982), and critiqued in Rumpelstiltskin Revisited:
The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, Note, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936,
1938-39 (1986), on the grounds that the Thirteenth Amendment permits family
relationships that compel the performance of personal services. Leaving aside
the accuracy of the analogy between a surrogacy contract and a marriage, it is
not the case that familial obligations (the author points, for example, to spousal
duties to provide sex, id. at 1938) are enforceable by criminal sanctions.
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culation of damages. The value of gestation is that it turns
an embryo into an infant, but pricing the child, which would
be necessary to award expectation damages, is odious and in-
appropriate."4 The obvious solution is to turn to the reliance
measure of damages, which aims to restore the parties to the
positions they held before entering into the contract."5 On
this approach, the intending parents would be able to recover
all of the payments made to the surrogate, as well as any
wasted costs incurred in reliance on the surrogate's perform-
ance.
The second claim the intending parents could make
would be a tort claim for destruction of the fetus. Many state
laws allow pregnant women to recover for injuries resulting
in the death of a fetus.2 6 Natural fathers cannot ordinarily
maintain actions against women who abort. This is at least
implicit in the Supreme Court decisions striking down
spousal notification and consent requirements.2 7 As between
two parents, the rule that the woman must be allowed freely
to decide whether or not to abort makes obvious sense: with
parental status in equipoise, her physical involvement in the
pregnancy assumes decisive tie-breaking status. However,
the issue posed in the surrogate context is somewhat differ-
ent because the surrogate is, in the property model, not the
mother. Her right to avoid unwanted gestation must, there-
fore, stand on its own.
The abortion right, as discussed above, does not include
the right to destroy20 ' but so long as separation and destruc-
tion are inextricable, tort liability for destruction casts a
shadow of constitutional dimensions. Allowing the surrogate
to abort while holding her liable for the death of the fetus is
rather like the vindication of Shylock's rights proposed by
204. See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981) (discussing ex-
pectation measure of damages).
205. See id. § 344 (discussing purposes of damages remedies); Id. § 349
(discussing reliance measure of damages); see generally, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. of Elizabethtown v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386 (3d Cir.1993) (discussing
availability of different measures of damages).
206. See generally Michelle D. Mills, Comment, Fetal Abuse Prosecutions:
The Triumph of Reaction Over Reason, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 992-93 (1998)
(discussing development of fetal tort law).
207. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895-98 (1992). If
spousal notification is an undue burden, a potential spousal tort suit surely is
as well.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
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Portia in The Merchant of Venice: the particular claim is up-
held but liability is imposed for unavoidable consequences.' °9
Because state tort laws may not infringe on constitutional
rights, no tort recovery is constitutionally permissible. 1"
The final abortion question is whether the intending par-
ents can require the surrogate to abort against her wishes. If
the abortion right were an aspect of procreative liberty, in-
tending parents would be the holders of the right. The
analysis of Planned Parenthood v. Casey might then seem to
suggest that no third party-including the surrogate-could
be given a veto power over their exercise of the right.21' But
what Casey's analysis shows is precisely that the abortion
right is personal to the pregnant woman and unrelated to
procreation. Thus the issue is whether the procreative lib-
erty interest of the intending parents can prevail over the
surrogate's right to bodily integrity.2 I think the answer
that it cannot is fairly clear. One might question whether the
surrogate's actions can even infringe on the parents' procrea-
tive liberty; a surrogate is not, after all, a state actor. The
reason that the parents have even a colorable constitutional
argument is that the state will declare them the parents of
the child.12 In any event, their procreative argument is a
weak one. Given the number of deliberate steps the intend-
ing parents have taken to set the process of procreation in
motion, their arguments for avoiding unwanted procreation
are severely attenuated. Therefore, in the absence of a con-
tractual provision, the constitutional balance tilts in the sur-
rogate's favor.
209. Portia upheld Shylock's claim to a pound of flesh but warned "if in the
cutting, thou dost shed/ One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods/ Are
by the laws of Venice confiscate/ Unto the state of Venice." WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice IV.i.309-12 (1597).
210. An analogy, though not a perfect one, may be drawn from the First
Amendment context. State laws allowing tort recovery for disclosure of law-
fully obtained private information are generally unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). If a newspaper had promised not to
disclose the information, and the information been disclosed in reliance on that
promise, a contract remedy would not offend the First Amendment. Cf Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (suggesting nondisclosure
agreements as less restrictive alternative to gag orders).
211. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895-98 (1992).
212. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277
(1990).
213. Absent state action, the parents would have no constitutional argu-
ments at all. See infra text accompanying notes 268-269.
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It is far less clear, however, that the surrogate's right to
refuse an abortion is inalienable. Compelled surgical proce-
dures violate the right to bodily integrity, not privacy, 214 and
submission to an abortion is probably the sort of personal
service contract that may be specifically enforced.215 A prom-
ise to accede to the intending parents' demand for an abor-
tion-apparently a common feature of surrogacy contracts,
typically conditioned on the detection of certain birth de-
fects216-is constitutionally suspect, if at all, only under the
general "shocks the conscience" test of substantive due proc-
ess. 21 7 Of course, such a substantive due process claim would
have a good chance of succeeding, and even if the offense to
conscience does not rise to a constitutional level, it seems un-
likely that a state's public policy would allow enforcement.
2. Conflicts Between the Intending Parents
Even after full performance of a surrogacy contract,
problems persist because the intending mother does not have
legally enforceable parental rights and will be disadvantaged
in a custody battle with her husband, the biological father.
Seymour v. Stotski 18 awarded custody of a baby girl produced
by a surrogacy agreement to the husband when the intending
parents divorced. The wife lacked standing to pursue a par-
entage action because she "had no legal relationship to the
child."29 The legal weakness of the unrelated intending par-
214. The right to bodily integrity derives from traditional and common law
antecedents. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1997) (discussing
right to bodily integrity). The point here is that surgical procedures do not
standardize people in the way that motherhood does; thus it is not a privacy
violation according to the Rubenfeld account. See Rubenfeld, supra note 193, at
789-90.
215. Such a passive and temporally-limited obligation does not have the
overtones of slavery that activate Thirteenth Amendment concerns. The sign-
ing of a diploma, for example, may be compelled under ordinary principles of
contract law, so not all actions can be characterized as personal service. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367, cmt. b (1981) (discussing per-
sonal service).
216. See Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to
the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 955 (1996).
217. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716-17
(1998).
218. 611 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
219. Id. at 458. What makes Seymour especially disturbing is that the child
was the product of donor sperm, insemination attempts with the husband's
sperm having failed. The husband thus lacked even the biological connection
on which the intending father's legal superiority usually rests. See also Doe v.
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ent mirrors the inequality between lesbian co-parents in
their rights with respect to a child conceived by artificial in-
semination.22 ° The disparity between the intending parents is
perhaps more troubling because it is almost invariably gen-
der-based: the intending father, but not the mother, will be a
legal parent. By contrast, in artificial insemination cases
with married couples, a consenting father will enjoy full pa-
rental rights and be at no disadvantage in a custody battle.22'
These issues are important; the facts of Seymour veered
from substantial unfairness to overwhelming tragedy when,
ordered by the court to surrender the child, Beverly Seymour
shot her ex-husband dead as he tried to take the girl from
her.2 One solution is to equalize the effect of the presump-
tion of legitimacy and provide that wives are presumptively
the mothers of their husband's children.2 The problem with
this is that a rebuttable presumption is nugatory,24 and a
conclusive one divests women of property rights in material
inside their bodies. Furthermore, a conclusive presumption
is unacceptable as a general rule of law, since it would oper-
ate in the case of adultery as well.2 5 Since surrogates intend
to divest themselves of such rights, allowing the transfer by
contract is a sensible resolution. Just as in the case of artifi-
cial insemination, 6 the property model allows for the donor's
rights to be not merely avoided, but transferred to the unre-
lated intending parent.
3. How Might Surrogacy Be Restricted?
No state has yet enforced a surrogacy agreement, and
there are substantial policy arguments against enforcement
if the surrogate recants.227 The current unenforceability of
Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1317 (Conn. 1998) (holding, in marital dissolution case,
that ex-wife is not a parent of child conceived via ordinary surrogacy).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 147-149.
221. Why this is not an equal protection violation is a mystery to me. For
evidence that the law is at least becoming more sensitive to such issues, see In
re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) (pointing to
similarities between artificial insemination and gestational surrogacy).
222. See Tamar Lewin, Custody Case in Ohio ends in Slaying and Prison
Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1990 at A9.
223. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 896-97 (Ct. App.
1994) (skeptically entertaining "reverse presumption" argument).
224. See id.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 116-118.
226. See supra text accompanying note 153.
227. Although my analysis suggests that surrogacy contracts should have
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surrogacy contracts, however, does not seem to advance a co-
herent policy because it relies on equating surrogacy to baby-
selling."8 Parties can make enforceable contracts simply by
eliminating the surrogate's biological relationship to the
child,"9 and the result may be a greater use of gestational
surrogacy.
Under the property model, states could use a number of
different legal devices to restrict surrogacy agreements.
They could, for example, provide that gestational mothers are
legal mothers, criminalize gestation of another woman's child
or merely prohibit payment for such gestation. The form of
such restrictions on surrogacy will be determined in part by
the nature of the substantive objections to the practice. Al-
though there are a number of distinct contentions, the com-
modification argument discussed below occupies a dominant
place in the literature, and this section assumes that it is the
animating policy concern.
Margaret Radin provides perhaps the best and most
complete statement of the commodification argument:
Market-inalienability [of surrogacy] might be grounded in
a judgment that commodification of women's reproductive
capacity is harmful for the identity aspect of their person-
hood and in a judgment that the closeness of paid surro-
gacy to baby-selling harms our self-conception too deeply.
There is certainly the danger that women's attributes,
such as height, eye color, race, intelligence, and athletic
ability, will be monetized. Surrogates with "better" quali-
legal effect-since if the intending parents can buy the surrogate's egg, her ges-
tation should not suffice to make her a parent-no one can deny the trauma in-
flicted on a surrogate by taking the baby from her. While the intending parents
will suffer if she keeps the child, her renunciation of the contract may be evi-
dence that she has bonded to the child in a way that they have not yet had an
opportunity to do. Thus allowing the surrogate to recant might minimize the
emotional harm to the parties.
There are also obvious problems with a legal regime under which the con-
tract is simply unenforceable-in economic terms, it amounts simply to giving
the surrogate a "put" option-but these may not be severe since only one per-
cent of surrogate mothers refuse to surrender the child. See Lacey, supra note
73, at 193.
228. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). "Baby-selling" itself is of
course a misnomer. Since parents do not own their children, they cannot sell
them; what is sold in the paradigmatic "baby sale" is the parental rights. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 410 (1992). Posner also offers a brief but
provocative rebuttal to the standard policy arguments against surrogacy, id. at
411-17, which is worth reading.
229. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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ties will command higher prices by virtue of those quali-
210ties.
Radin's conception of personhood and the resulting corn-
modification argument has been criticized strongly, but I
think somewhat uncharitably, on the grounds that it both
fails to provide a criterion of non-commodifiability and
reaches results opposite to those its proponents seek. John
Hill claims that "we cannot sort neatly between inherently
intrinsic and extrinsic attributes on the basis of the attribute
itself 231' and concludes:
Indeed, it would be more logical, on this view, to place at-
tributes such as character, personality, and intelligence,
which generally are thought to be central to our innermost
being, beyond the reach of the market and to permit the
commodification of physical attributes such as eye color
and sexual attractiveness. On such a view, prostitution
would be permitted while teaching philosophy would be
placed outside the realm of the market.2 2
The commodification argument can, however, meet these
objections with only a minor adjustment. The focus should be
on activities, rather than attributes, and the criterion should
be shifted slightly, from the nature of the activity to its role
in society. Deeming an activity market-inalienable on the
basis of its proximity to personhood may give us the peculiar
result that teaching philosophy should be market-inalienable.
If the test looks to the role that the uncompensated activity
plays in our society, however, this result is avoided. Unpaid
philosophical instruction is not widely regarded as constitu-
tive of selfhood, though its practitioners may find it so, and
be deeply offended by those who perform for profit. But un-
paid-for sexual intercourse, for example, plays a central role
in the expression and constitution of love and romantic rela-
tionships. It is this fact, I think, that accounts for the belief
that sex for pay demeans both its practitioners and society at
large; payment for an activity undermines the perception of it
as non-monetizable, and there are some things we do not like
to see translated into currency.233 Similarly, unpaid-for ges-
230. Radin, supra note 1, at 1932.
231. Hill, supra note 3, at 413.
232. Id.
233. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 31-
32 (1978). Calabresi and Bobbit call this the "costs of costing." See id.
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tation is fundamental to the creation of the family.
The commodification argument should thus rest on the
claim that paying for the service of gestation brings the taint
of the market to an activity which is central to personhood.
So phrased, it is not easily dismissed, and it is plausible to
argue that, like prostitution, gestation for profit should be
criminalized as an offense against the moral fabric of society.
The argument should not, however, obscure the facts: (1)
what is objectionable is not the sale of the egg but the sale of
the service; (2) the surrogate mother has no parental rights;
and (3) the intending parents are the legal parents of the
child. That is, on the property model, a surrogacy contract
(seen as the purchase of the surrogate's egg) does have the
desired legal effect of making parental rights vest in the in-
tending parents. "Refusing to enforce" such contracts, in the
way that courts have done, simply leaves the child with a
woman who is not its mother.
2 34
C. Embryos and In Vitro Fertilization
Another question raised by new reproductive technolo-
gies concerns the treatment of human embryos created for in
vitro fertilization. In this procedure, a woman's egg is ex-
tracted and fertilized outside the body. The resulting zygote
or "pre-embryo" is then implanted in a gestational host who
carries it to term; it may also be frozen for later use.
235 Some
of the issues created by this procedure may also fall under
the rubric of surrogacy if the gestational host is not the in-
tending mother. In such cases, as the preceding section sug-
gests, the intending parents should be the legal parents be-
cause those holding property rights in the embryo at the
beginning of gestation should receive parental rights.
The problems unique to in vitro fertilization arise when
disputes occur about the ownership or control of pre-embryos.
Such disputes may take two forms: (1) between intending
parents and third parties and (2) between the intending par-
ents themselves. Conflicts of the former sort are usually re-
234. This result could be justified by a rule providing that any payment in
excess of the costs of pregnancy voids the transfer of rights in the surrogate's
egg.
235. For a more detailed exposition of the in vitro fertilization procedure, see
ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 97-99.
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solved fairly easily in favor of the parents. 216 More difficulties
intrude in the latter type of situations, where both parties
raise constitutional claims and the conventional law of mari-
tal property seems inadequate.
Two cases have addressed the issue of the control of em-
bryos produced by a couple that subsequently divorces. In
Davis v. Davis,237 the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that
contracts providing for contingencies such as divorce would
generally be upheld. 38 The court further stated that where
no agreed-upon resolution exists, making one gamete pro-
vider a parent against his or her will would inflict a greater
burden than denying the other one the opportunity to use the
embryos at issue to procreate.239 Thus the party wishing to
avoid procreation will ordinarily prevail.24 ° Disposition of the
embryos implicated fundamental rights both to avoid pro-
creation and to procreate. Dividing the embryos equally
would clearly not protect this negative right, and the court
concluded that the only acceptable resolution was to grant
both parties veto power over their use.24'
A different approach was taken by the New York Su-
preme Court in Kass v. Kass.42 Reasoning that in vitro fer-
tilization differed in no relevant way from in vivo fertiliza-
tion, the court concluded that the wife must have the
exclusive right to control the disposition of pre-embryos, just
as she could choose whether or not to have an abortion.42
The husband's right to avoid procreation was held waived by
his participation in an in vitro program. 44 This decision be-
trays a serious understanding of either procreative liberty or
privacy, perhaps both.45 Kass was reversed on appeal, and
the New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed the rever-
sal. While the ultimate court declined to provide a general
236. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
237. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
238. Davis, 842 S.W.2d, at 597.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 604. If the party wishing to use the embryos had no "reasonable
possibility" of procreation by other means, a different analysis might be called
for. Id.
241. Id.
242. Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), rev'd
663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1997), and affd 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
243. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 at *3.
244. Id.
245. See infra text accompanying notes 266-267.
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framework for resolving disputes over embryos, finding an
unambiguous agreement between the parties, it rested its de-
cision on the principle that the agreement should control."6
1. Procreative Liberty Defined
A resolution of the problems posed by disputes over em-
bryos requires a preliminary inquiry into the nature of the
right of procreation. As a general matter, we may define pro-
creative liberty simply as the right to choose whether or not
to become a parent, or, more precisely, to choose to create a
child of which one is the legal parent.47 The uncertainty sur-
rounding the concept of parenthood creates a corresponding
indeterminacy within this definition. What follows is an exe-
gesis that draws from the property model of parenthood.
a. The Right to Procreate
There are two components to the positive procreative
right: creating the child and acquiring parental rights.248
Laws that restrict either component will offend the positive
freedom to procreate.249 Thus laws that prohibit conception
and those that vest parental rights in someone other than the
intending parents infringe equally.' The growth of nontra-
246. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179-80.
247. The clearest statement of the procreative liberty interest is Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing right to decide "whether to bear
or beget a child"). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(recognizing rights to conceive and raise children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 393 (1923) (rights to "marry, establish a home, and bring up children").
The precise meaning of Eisenstadt's "bear or beget" formulation, though it may
have been clear in 1972, is no longer. As we have seen before, technology al-
lows us to divide what was once indivisible. I adopt the definition I do because
Eisenstadt's focus seems fairly understood as the creation of not only the child
(the narrow issue, since Eisenstadt is about contraception) but also the parent-
child relationship. That relationship, once created, is also constitutionally pro-
tected. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
If Lehr's soaring rhetoric about the opportunity afforded biological parents
to develop a relationship with the child, id. at 262, means anything, it must
mean that the state's ability to interfere with the vesting of parental rights is
subject to constitutional constraints.
248. As discussed in the preceding note, Eisenstadt expressly affirms the
right to create the child, and, in conjunction with later cases dealing with pa-
rental rights, cannot fairly be read to exclude the right to acquire parental
status.
249. See supra note 248.
250. Termination of parental rights is a distinct issue. Although the parent-
child relationship is constitutionally protected, the interest in continued paren-
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ditional techniques of reproduction raises the question of
whether the availability of other traditional means permits
some state restrictions on the broad procreative freedom
promised by new technologies.
A flatly negative answer would imply that the state may
neither regulate reproduction nor provide unalterable rules
determining parental status. If this were the case, a conclu-
sive presumption of legitimacy would unconstitutionally in-
fringe the rights of men wishing to procreate with married
women by denying them that opportunity; and laws prohib-
iting the sale of embryos would violate the rights of any par-
ties wishing to buy them for procreation. But conclusive pre-
sumptions are constitutional,25' and states may surely place
restrictions on the sale of embryos. Procreative absolutism is
clearly too extreme a position to assimilate into the existing
legal framework; it implies the unconstitutionality of some
regulations that have been upheld against constitutional
challenge, and some that have never been challenged.
Some state regulation is, therefore, compatible with pro-
creative liberty, and to the extent that regulation is part of
our cultural heritage, as is the presumption of legitimacy, it
may only gradually come to be seen as a restriction. Laws
against fornication and adultery play similar roles and, like
the presumption of legitimacy, are emerging from their his-
torically uncontroversial status to be contested as illegitimate
restrictions.25
An exhaustive investigation of procreative liberty is an
arduous task well beyond the scope of this article. The only
relevant question at this point is to what extent the state can
limit the use of nontraditional reproduction, and the answer I
suggest is only tentative. A reasonable conception of the
scope of procreative liberty is that the state may regulate as
it pleases (in a nondiscriminatory fashion) to the extent that
it leaves parties ample other means of procreation.25 It may
tal rights is not, strictly speaking, a procreative interest.
251. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
252. Though not with any success. See, e.g., Oliverson v. West Valley City,
875 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Utah. 1995) (upholding Utah's adultery statute against
substantive due process and First Amendment challenges).
253. John Robertson reaches roughly the same result, concluding that re-
strictions on assisted reproduction by the infertile should be analyzed like re-
strictions on coital reproduction by the fertile. See ROBERTSON, supra note 38,
at 39. This formulation, though working within the substantive due process
tradition, resembles the classic First Amendment analysis of content-neutral
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prohibit use of any nontraditional reproductive technology by
a fertile couple; it may not do the same to an infertile couple
without a compelling interest to which the restriction is nar-
rowly tailored.254
On this analysis, a woman who cannot bear children has
a constitutionally protected interest in employing a surrogate
without interference from the state.25 Determining whether
making surrogacy market-inalienable, as discussed above, is
unconstitutional under this standard requires us to decide
whether the state interest in avoiding commodification is
compelling, and whether a ban on paid surrogacy is narrowly
tailored to promote that interest-an inquiry of uncertain
outcome.
b. The Right Not to Procreate
The right not to procreate, the negative component of
procreative liberty, is the right not to have parental rights
vest against one's will. ' While the positive right is infringed
by either restrictions on conception or restrictions on transfer
of reproductive material, a violation of the negative right is
produced simply by state action that creates unwilling, origi-
nal, legal parents.25 '
time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (upholding ordinance prohibiting use of sound trucks on grounds that
other means of communication were open). Like the classic First Amendment
analysis, it is vulnerable to the legal realist critique that by promoting a formal
equality it reproduces existing distributions of wealth and power within the
right it claims to protect. See generally J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Plu-
ralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375
(1990). The concern is that only the wealthy infertile will be able to afford non-
traditional reproduction.
254. The narrow tailoring to serve a compelling interest is required by stan-
dard substantive due process analysis, which governs the fundamental right to
procreative liberty. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98
(1965). Because the creation of the child is part of the procreative right, adop-
tion is not a substitute.
255. Expanding the class of legal parents does not obviously violate procrea-
tive liberty as I have defined it. The state might, then, provide that surrogates
retain parental rights; what it cannot do is prevent parental rights from vesting
in the intending mother.
256. The negative aspect of the right is implicit in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing right to decide "whether to bear or beget a
child"), since the right to decide includes the right to decide negatively. See
also ROBERTSON, supra 38, at 22-27.
257. See ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 26-29 (discussing negative procrea-
tive liberty). If the unwilling parents are not original, the violation is not
clearly of the right not to procreate. Forcing adoption of unwanted children is
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The negative right, like the positive, cannot be absolute.
If it were, parties could simply relinquish their property
rights at any time before the beginning of gestation and avoid
parental status. Our law clearly does not countenance this;
most obviously, it vests parental rights in parties who engage
in intercourse regardless of their intentions."8
Some restrictions on the right not to procreate are clearly
permissible: a man who has intercourse with a woman, or a
husband who consents to the insemination of his wife, cannot
deny parenthood by asserting procreative freedom. Others
are not; the state cannot constitutionally assign parental
status on whatever grounds it sees fit.259 A tentative proposal
for analyzing claims of negative procreative liberty is the fol-
lowing: the state may not make parents of those who did not
(intentionally or unintentionally) play some role in creating
the child, and its burden in justifying its rule decreases ac-
cording to the number of affirmative steps the parties have
taken to create the child. The property model provides a de-
fault rule for the absence of state intervention. 60
The implications of this understanding of the right not to
procreate are startling, although they may not be immedi-
ately clear. The right, I claim, is the right to avoid the vest-
ing of parental status. It has no necessary connection to a
right to control genetic material. If the state demands eggs
from fertile women, intending to make them available to the
infertile, it would not infringe on negative procreative lib-
erty.261 More realistically, if the state requisitions embryos
certainly unwise and probably unconstitutional, but not an infringement on the
right not to procreate.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 156-169.
259. Requiring a couple to reproduce, by whatever means, would violate
other rights-most likely, it would shock the conscience sufficiently to trigger
substantive due process protection. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716-17 (1998). The clearest example of a pure violation of
negative procreative liberty would be the state's determination that certain
unwilling individuals would be the parents of a child to be conceived by others.
260. A criticism that further parallels the legal realist attack on traditional
First Amendment doctrine suggests itself here: the property-derived baseline is
not neutral, but rather the product of state regulation. This is true, but given
that parenthood is a legal relation, some legal framework must be taken as the
background. Since it is control over genetic information that is at issue here,
intellectual property provides the most appropriate legal framework. It seems
reasonable-though it is not currently the law-that individuals might have
something like copyright protection of their genetic information. See generally
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANs, SoFrwARE & SPLEENS 97-108 (1996).
261. It would certainly infringe on bodily integrity, and probably would not
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held by a fertility center, issues of procreative liberty arise
only if the materials have been designated for particular par-
ties, and then the question is one of positive procreative lib-
erty. That is, the question would be whether these parties
have alternate means of reproducing. Apart from that poten-
tial issue, this would be a garden-variety taking; even if the
owners of the embryos wanted them destroyed, there would
be no negative procreative liberty claim.
This result is undeniably counterintuitive, but the idea
that there exists a procreative right to control genetic mate-
rial is simply untenable. Such a right would be threatened
by the decisions of our siblings and trampled by those of our
twins. The point is not merely that siblings and twins are
allowed to reproduce without our consent; they would be
permitted under a balancing test that weighed positive
against negative procreative liberty. It is rather that no bal-
ancing of rights occurs. Our control over our genetic material
is rooted in property rights and unrelated to procreation.262
Severing negative procreational liberty from control over
genetic material has immediate consequences. Consider an
ordinary coital pregnancy, and suppose that the embryo may
be safely removed from the womb. The abortion right is a
right to separate, not to destroy.263 Therefore, the destruction
of the fetus is a question of procreative liberty. This liberty
interest exists: since parental rights vest at the beginning of
gestation leading to birth, an extracted embryo would have
no legal parents until that gestation began. The biological
progenitors would have rights, grounded in negative procrea-
tive liberty and privacy,264 not to be the legal parents. The
state could vindicate those rights, however, simply by vesting
survive constitutional scrutiny. Requisitioning sperm from men would be a
lesser infringement and might well be upheld, although the ready availability of
donor sperm suggests an easy alternative. For a suggestion that a nondis-
criminatory bone marrow draft might appropriately be found constitutionally
sound, see Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term; - Foreword: Anti-
discrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan De-
bate Ignores) 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 95 (1991).
262. For another example, a scientist could conceivably, though not cur-
rently, create a complete human genetic sequence. If he happened to produce
mine, I would gain no rights thereby. If, as is possible, he took cells from me
and cloned them, I would have a property-based claim.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
264. The negative procreative right is clear; the privacy right flows from the
fact that parenthood is a role that "inform[s] the totality of a person's life." See
Rubenfeld, supra note 193, at 784.
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parental status in other parties. The ability to destroy the
embryo would then be supported only by a property right,
which the state could constitutionally revoke as long as it
provided compensation.1
6
1
2. Embryos and Procreative Liberty
The above analysis applies to a dispute over embryos.
From this perspective, the approach of the lower court in
Kass is flawed because it conflates abortion and procreative
rights.2 66 It lodges sole decision-making power in the woman
simply because she may choose whether or not to abort, but
the rights at stake are quite different.67 Less obviously, the
decision in Davis v. Davis268 is also wrong. The parties do
have competing claims of positive and negative procreative
liberty, but vindicating the right not to procreate does not re-
quire destruction of the embryos. Conventional property law
respects both parties' procreative rights. The court could di-
vide the embryos equally and parental rights would vest only
in the party who owned the embryo. Alternatively, awarding
all embryos to the party intending to procreate would equally
satisfy the negative right and better protect the positive
right.
The suggested resolution may seem heartless; after all,
Junior Davis testified that he would definitely consider any
resulting children his own.26  Legally, however, they would
not be. Junior Davis' plight testifies to the dangers of losing
control over one's reproductive material and a state wishing
to protect the psychological interest in not having unwanted
genetic children might adopt a rule that jointly owned extra-
corporeal biological property must be destroyed at either
265. See U.S. CONST. amend. 14.
266. See 1995 W.L. 110368 at *2, *3. The New York Court of Appeals recog-
nized this. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-80 (N.Y. 1998).
267. Analytically, the difference is clear: the abortion right is grounded in
privacy and relates to a woman's control over her own body. It is, as discussed
above, a right to separate, not to destroy. There is a further privacy concern at
stake-the negative procreative right to avoid unwanted parenthood-but this
right belongs, equally to men and women and is in no way dependent on the
abortion right. Despite this clear conceptual distinction, commentators have
tried to leverage the asymmetry of the abortion right into a variety of other
contexts. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 185 at 145 (1986) (suggesting that a
woman's right to an abortion implies a right to custody of the child at birth).
268. See supra notes 36-41, 237-241 and accompanying text.
269. See 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
134 [Vol. 39
THE NEWEST PROPERTY
party's request."' What it does not do is uncover a constitu-tional right based on mere genetic contribution.27'
D. Posthumous Reproduction
The final question, from a certain perspective, posed by
novel reproductive technologies is how to treat posthumous
reproduction. This may occur whenever reproductive mate-
rial is used after the donor's death. Donors may be male or
female and the material may be gametes (sperm or eggs) or
embryos obtained either by testamentary disposition or by
postmortem harvesting.272 The various possibilities raise is-
sues that overlap significantly, and a useful path into the
analysis is a famous dispute over a bequest of sperm.
In 1991, William Kane committed suicide at the Mirage
Hotel in Las Vegas.27 His will bequeathed "all right, title,
and interest" in 15 vials of sperm he had deposited at Cryo-
bank, Inc., a Los Angeles sperm bank, to his girlfriend, Debo-
rah Hecht.274 Kane's children, perhaps fearing the creation of
other claims against Kane's estate, made policy arguments
against posthumous reproduction to contest her claims of
ownership and asked that the sperm be destroyed.275
270. Since this policy argument has no constitutional grounding, states could
also turn in the opposite direction and prohibit the destruction of embryos, even
if both parties so desire. Several states have enacted such laws. See ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129
(West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.2661-5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
271. Still less does it suggest that one private party's failure to respect an-
other's preferences-which is all Mary Sue's actions amount to--can amount to
a constitutional violation. If the state does not attempt to force parental status
on Junior Davis, it takes no action at all with respect to his procreative liberty.
Even in the slightly more difficult situation in which the state does bestow pa-
rental status on an unintentional parent, the argument that this trenches on
constitutional liberty has been rejected. See Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d
713, 715-16 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that mother's misrepresentation about use of
contraception did not violate father's procreative liberty). While I have sug-
gested that there may be limits to the state's power to draft citizens into par-
enthood, no case has yet come close to them.
272. The maintenance of brain-dead pregnant women in order to deliver ba-
bies is also often considered under the rubric of posthumous reproduction. See,
e.g., John A. Robertson, Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics-Posthumous Repro-
duction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1027 (1994). On my model, parental rights are de-
termined at the beginning of gestation, and death occurring after that time
does not raise the issue of posthumous reproduction.
273. See David Margolick, Battle Royal at the Sperm Bank, S.F. CHRON.,
May 15, 1994 (This World), at 6.
274. See Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 840 (Ct. App. 1993).
275. See id. at 844.
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The California Court of Appeals, in its first decision, held
that the decedent had a property interest in his sperm and
that his intentions for its disposition were controlling. 27 6 It
thus granted a writ prohibiting destruction pending the dis-
tribution of the estate.277 Pursuant to a "global settlement
agreement" that divided the estate 80%-20% between the
children and Hecht, the executor allotted three of the fifteen
vials to Hecht, but delayed distribution while appeal was
pending.278 A second trip to the Court of Appeals resulted in
immediate dispensation of these three vials, on the grounds
that Hecht, then forty, faced a rapidly closing window of fer-
tility.279 Failing to conceive with the first two vials, Hecht re-
turned to court seeking the last twelve. 28" The Court of Ap-
peals' final opinion held that because the disposition of
Kane's sperm implicated his fundamental right to procreate,
Hecht was legally incapable of conveying it to his children
under the settlement agreement: "IT]he decedent's right to
procreate with whom he chooses cannot be defeated by some
contract third persons-including his chosen donee-
construct and sign."28' The California Supreme Court, deny-
ing review, ordered that the opinion not be officially pub-
lished, eliminating its precedent value.282
As a result of the de-certification, the series of Hecht de-
cisions may stand for little more than the proposition that
hard cases make bad law. Kane intended indisputably that
Hecht have his sperm, and her long struggle could hardly fail
to arouse sympathy. The Court of Appeals reached a tempt-
ing result, but its ringing endorsement of a fundamental
right to posthumous procreation and the conclusion that
Kane's desires should prevail over the contractually ex-
pressed intent of his chosen recipient goes too far.
The property model makes clear that posthumous pro-
creation is not a fundamental right but an impossibility.
Procreative liberty has as an essential constituent-the crea-
tion or avoidance of parental status. Property rights deter-
276. Id. at 850.
277. Id. at 858-61.
278. See Kane v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1581 (1995).
279. See id. at 1581-82.
280. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 225 (1996) (unpublished table
decision).
281. See id. at 226
282. Id. at 222.
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mine the allocation of parental rights and dead people cannot
own property. Therefore, they cannot become parents and no
disposition of preserved reproductive material can infringe on
their procreative liberty.
This fact does not prescribe any particular treatment of
frozen sperm that a decedent wills to another, but it does
make the difficulties somewhat more tractable. If the be-
quest is honored, only the legatee holds property rights in the
sperm. On the facts of the case, if Hecht conceived and bore
a child with the frozen sperm, she would be the mother and
the child would have no father. Therefore, the concern that
posthumous reproduction complicates the administration of
the decedent's estate rests on an illusion.83
The same principles operate with regard to preserved
eggs or embryos.284 Resulting children are not the decedent's.
Since decedents have no procreative rights to be violated, the
state can regulate quite broadly the testamentary disposition
of reproductive material.85 What constitutional concerns
there are arise from property rights. 86 A slightly more inter-
esting question centers on the decedent's ability to restrict
the legatee's use of the material. This is properly a question
of trusts and estates, and state law will govern the questions
of what happens if the legatee fails to comply with the re-
strictions of the bequest. I venture only the observation that
283. For a pseudo-problem, it has received an inordinate amount of scholarly
attention. See, e.g., James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving
the Issues Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technologies and the
Law of Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743 (1998); Christine A. Djalleta, A
Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to the Uniform, Probate
Code in Light of New Reproductive Technologies, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 335 (1994).
284. They also control sperm or egg harvesting. The next of kin, or whoever
authorizes the harvesting, will be the parents, and the state may regulate
broadly without infringing on procreative liberties.
285. The policy reasons that might support prohibition of such bequests are
not readily apparent. The Kane children advanced three concerns: ease of ad-
ministering estates, the undesirability of single parents, and generalized dis-
taste for posthumous reproduction. See Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
275, 284-91 (Ct. App. 1993). The court rejected all three. Id. Rightly so, be-
cause posthumous reproduction does not implicate them differently from other
techniques of nontraditional reproduction. Administration of estates is unaf-
fected, and single women can under existing law become the sole parents of
children conceived with donor sperm. Moreover, the donor of such sperm may
well be dead at the time of insemination.
286. Some restrictions on testamentary dispositions are unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (noting that right to transfer
property while alive is not adequate substitute for right to bequeath).
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it is important to distinguish between use restrictions that
simply require the recipient to procreate with the material
and those that require her to do so with her own biological
material. The former type would allow a woman to hire a
surrogate and would allow a man to use donor sperm."
VI. CONCLUSION
New reproductive technologies have brought new compli-
cations to family law. Resolution of the novel questions
posed requires us not so much to turn to new concepts as to
recognize those that have been with us all along. Realizing
that parental rights are best understood as derived from
property rights gives us first principles from which we can
reason. The property model provides an analytic framework
that readily assimilates new technologies and reveals with
clarity and certainty the limits and effects of state regulation
and individual agreements.
Not only should we begin to recognize parental rights as
derived from property rights, we must. If not, we must re-
shape our legal landscape to rebury this emerging fact.
Whatever alternative paradigm may be proposed,288 the de-
veloping law determines parental rights in many cases by
looking to antecedent property rights."9 We ignore this only
at substantial intellectual cost. I have not attempted to re-
solve all of the policy issues raised by nontraditional repro-
duction, and the answers I have given are far from final. I
have tried instead to reveal the means by which the law
reaches its results, and in so doing to provide a language the
287. The potential for some very odd results does exist: suppose A bequeaths
sperm to B on the condition that she use it herself; otherwise it passes to C. If
B receives the sperm but then hires a surrogate to gestate it, her failure to
comply with the restrictions might make C the owner. Whether C would then
have parental rights is a difficult question.
288. The leading contender is of course the intentional model, as discussed
supra text accompanying notes 63-79. I think that the intentional model is
simply a weaker and less coherent version of the property model. See supra
text accompanying notes 63-79.
289. Courts have not explicitly recognized this. But I think that the property
model offers the most convincing explanation of how, for example, a semen do-
nor avoids parental rights, see UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION Act § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 189 (Supp 1988), why gestational surrogates
are not parents, see, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) and why
posthumous children cannot inherit, see UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF AS-
SISTED CONCEPTION Act § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 189 (Supp 1988).
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future may speak.
The chief benefit I claim for the property model is that it
clearly reveals the legal mechanism by which parental rights
are determined. This allows private parties to make con-
tracts with predictable legal effect; similarly, it allows states
to regulate the allocation of parental rights without having to
contend with nebulous and untrammeled intent-based par-
enthood. I do not, however, intend to suggest that property
law is or should be the entire story.
State regulation must be sensitive to the unique features
of reproductive property. It cannot be determined simply by
the policies that conventional property law seeks to promote.
In much the same way that the pieces of property known as
"securities" have given rise to a distinct field of law, moti-
vated by its own concerns, reproductive property demands a
regulatory framework that responds to the place the parental
relationship holds in our society.
In cases of dispute over ownership of embryos, for exam-
ple, conventional principles of marital property law would
dictate an equal division between divorcing spouses. 90 If one
spouse opposes the creation of children from the embryos, as
Junior Davis did, his interests will not be well protected by
an equal division."' Junior Davis' claims of psychological dis-
tress do not, I have argued, raise a constitutional issue of
negative procreative liberty. 92 If he is not legally a parent,
his procreative freedom is not infringed. Yet it would be an
unfeeling court indeed that saw no harm to him in the crea-
tion of his biological children against his will. Genetic con-
nection is socially important, and legal rules offering en-
hanced control over the disposition of reproductive property
could be used to recognize this social fact.
Rules that refuse such enhanced control might come to
be accepted. The value-shaping effect of law is considerable,
but it may well be that the values implicit in the property
model are not those we want for our society. Parental rights,
I have argued, are best understood as flowing simply from
property rights, but parental relation, historically, has re-
quired much more.293 A world in which parents contribute
290. See, e.g, UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 17, 9A U.L.A. 146 (1983).
291. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 268-269.
293. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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equally to their child's genetic makeup, in which they watch
it grow within its mother's womb, may attach greater social
meaning to the parent-child relationship than one in which a
single person may buy sperm and eggs on the market, hire a
surrogate to gestate an embryo, and receive a newborn baby
at the end of a contract. Timidity may be appropriate as we
approach a brave new world.
